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Hey, Adam curry, John C. Dvorak.

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It's Sunday, July 28 2013. Time
for you get more nation media

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assassination episode 534.

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This is no agenda.

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And we are coming to you live
almost kind of not really on

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tape because it is the week that
we're off, but we're bringing

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you fresh content from somewhere
in Europe. I'm Adam curry,

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and from Northern Silicon Valley
where I am on digital tape. I'm

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John C. Dvorak scale.

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That's right, everybody. It is
Sunday. And I'm your half host,

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Adam,

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and I'm your half host, John.

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And today is a second of our two
shows that we're doing this

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summer. So we can take a little
bit of time off, though it turns

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out, it's actually it's more
work. It's more work than it's

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worth. We should work to do it
this way. Yeah. So we have two

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interviews coming up for you.
The one that we'll start off

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with is an interview I did
during the just before the

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release of Daniel Suarez, his
book Kill Decision. It's all

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about drones. And we also touch
briefly on his previous work,

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which is demon and freedom TM,
and I hope you enjoy it. And

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after that we have John's
interview with some intelligence

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guy. What was it again, John?

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John Dixon was a security
expert, and also former Air

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Force Intelligence. And so he
has some thoughts about the NSA

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and some of the stuff that goes
down. interesting interview, to

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say the least. Good good chat
with him. All right,

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we kick it off first with my
interview. Originally done just

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before the release of the Book.
Kill Decision and with it's

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Daniel Suarez. I think probably
the most feared man in the

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military industrial complex,
we'll be talking to him. Here's

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his book. His latest is killed
decision. Daniel Suarez joins us

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from California. Damn right. I
can play down. Yeah, absolutely.

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Thanks for having me. Well, no.
And thank you very much for not

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only sending me this book, but
for writing it. I gotta tell

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you, I'm an aviator. I've been
flying airplanes and

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helicopters. I've taken a great
interest, of course, and

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unmanned aerial vehicles. And
once again, very much like your

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previous books that I've read
demon and freedom TM, you've

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nailed it. You nailed all the
technical aspects. But also, to

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me, almost not science fiction.
It's like, this sounds like it's

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pretty much when did you write
the book? When was it completed?

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I was completed, oh, I don't
know, six, seven months ago,

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something like that. So fairly
recently. And it probably took

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me about, I don't know, 1312
months to write. Most of that,

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of course, is research. But
really, I do this just over the

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horizon type thing. So you know,
when you say really not science

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fiction, definitely. So I've
combined things that if they

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don't already exist, they will
very soon.

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So let's so let's talk about the
story. First of all, a female

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protagonist, which was a
departure at least from from

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demon freedom. It really breaks
down the possibility, though, in

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perhaps the likelihood of
unmanned aerial vehicles, ie

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drones making decisions on their
own, and the implications of

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that and what could happen. Now,
it's always difficult with a

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book like this, which has some
cool twists and turns and some

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some things that pop up that I
thought were very unexpected,

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and then some wildly outrageous
things when it comes to big

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tankers and all kinds of nutty
stuff going on oil tankers or

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troop carriers. I can't even
tell you. I don't I'm afraid of

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spoiling parts, you wouldn't
want to be known. So maybe you

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can synopsize this. For us.

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Yeah, I've already figured out
my kind of, you know, snooping

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through the minefield story to
not reveal anything, any

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spoilers, but it is essentially
about a situation where the

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United States has itself come
under attack, targeted attack by

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autonomous drones, origin
unknown. And it really examines

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a situation where drones have
proliferated to the extent they

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are all over the world. And it
becomes very difficult to

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determine who is attacking you.
And so a very superior military

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power, suddenly, you get into
this power imbalance where

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there's this nonstop sort of low
intensity warfare going on. And

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I do think this is headed
towards us. Because again, if

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you can't figure out who's
attacking you, it doesn't matter

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how powerful you are. And that's
really the situation the story

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examines, and it's one that I
think is coming very soon,

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because, you know, you look at
because of the global economy,

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high tech manufacturing occurs
all over the world now. And

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those designs because of cyber
espionage and cyber war, a lot

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of CAD designs and other top
secret designs are also

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disappearing off Western
networks to the far corners of

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the world. So the combination of
those things that very cheap,

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sort of Ubik Wood is processing
power and manufacturing of high

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tech all around the world
combined with designs that

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support that type of thing is
going to really create a very,

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very fractured high tech
military ecosystem. And that's

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that's what the story examines
is that high concept of the

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United States is under attack by
drones. And we don't know who's

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sending them.

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And what's what I really like,
as kind of a sub story is the

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entire and I'm I watch C span
all the time. And I think you

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can't write that shit. It's so
funny sometimes. But you know,

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we've had a lot of department,
Homeland Security, Department of

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Defense, a lot of budget
conversations in the past six

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months. And in the book itself,
the you know, a lot of this is

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about the funding, and you know,
what is going to instigate

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funding for more drones, and
indeed, these autonomous drones?

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Now, I know a little bit about
your background know, you're

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basically at heart as a software
engineer developer. Some would

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call that consultant for you've
done a lot for Fortune 1000

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companies, but also for defense,
I believe. So when you put

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something like that in there, is
that based on your own

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experience? Is it just what you
think it might be? Or how it'll

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work? Or are you just dreaming
it up?

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Yeah, a little, little of all of
those things. You know, just to

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be clear, you know, I worked in
it in designing Big Data Systems

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for companies. So companies that
had, let's say, wanted to do pre

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production planning of vast
networks of factories and things

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like that. So really complex
stuff did some defense work as

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well. Especially y2k
remediation, things like that.

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The big scam? Yeah, well, you
know, it's funny, you take a

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look at a lot of the stuff I
had, I had friends and relatives

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who were like hoarding
cigarettes, because they were

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convinced that was going to be
the new currency, I'm going to

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be a problem. I'm going to be at
a party. I don't know why you

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guys should do it. But anyway, I
digress. But basically, I

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definitely don't take anything
top secrets, there was one of

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the things that people ask me is
like, how do you do research for

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this. And, again, because this
technology, you look at what is

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being able to be done with
everything from DIY Drones, to

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just consumer tech that you can
buy, what I typically do with my

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stories is I'll combine those
things. And then I'll sort of

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divine what I think is just
around the corner, based on what

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I would do, given these
possibilities with a better

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budget, and also rumors of
prototypes that are out there.

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So that's basically how I how I
assemble, you know, what the

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tech is going to be the
disruptive tech in one of my

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tech thrillers. And as far as
the government and private

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industry and the intersection of
international corporate

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malfeasance and otherwise, those
things, I think there's a great

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record for that already. So as a
tech writer, you stir those all

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into a pot, you can pretty much
come up with a really, first of

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all, thrilling lots of action
and other things like that. So

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that's generally how I construct
these stories.

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He says something very
important. This is indeed a

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thriller. I mean, these books
that you write are thrillers.

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And it's kind of funny how,
when, when I first read demon,

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and its successor, Freedom TM,
you know, the Google Glasses had

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not been announced yet. They're
probably already in development.

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But that was also only a couple
of years separation. And now

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here it is. And, you know, I,
when I was reading, Kill

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Decision, the the technical
aspects were so good. I mean,

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even in the first may be page
30, there's mention of Gorgon

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stare, which I don't think
anyone knows about. I mean,

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that's why

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I put it there, it's important
to me that people know that

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these things are, are really
accelerating, and that they are

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occurring, really, it's not even
like their secret, it's just

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that they don't get really very
much media attention. It's one

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of the driving reasons I write
these is, these are fast moving,

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sort of nuanced, complex things
that are happening that are

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changing society with this
technology evolving, and I want

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people to understand it. So I
tried to write these thrillers,

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and I write them as thrillers,
so that you're really

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entertained and intrigued as you
go along. But you're also

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learning basically what all this
tech is and how it might change

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society. That's really one of my
goals. So top priorities make it

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entertaining and exciting. But
then, of course, what interests

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me is, is the payload that comes
along with it.

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So do you worry about this
stuff? Do you? Do you worry

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about the possible future of
autonomous drones to such an

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extent that you say, Okay, I
have to write this book. It's

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important that people understand
this unpackaging it in a

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thriller in, you know, soft
science fiction, but I really

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need to get the This is why my
introduction is setting you up

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perhaps the most feared men in
the military industrial complex,

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you know, it could also be that
you're that you're a promoter of

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but you could easily be a shill
for them. I don't know. I doubt

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it. But, but but there's you're
really sending Your message and

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to me it arrived loud and clear.

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Well, I'm glad of that. And I
will say this most feared men in

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the industrial, military
industrial complex I, I tend to

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think not I, I my encounter with
military people has been that

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there's a split. It's a lot of
people in the military who have

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similar concerns to society at
large. And they sort of get it.

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I you know, if I have a theme,
it's this, that I'm against

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unaccountable concentrations of
power, and I don't care whether

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it's corporate, military,
religious, the Girl Scouts, I

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don't care who it is. And this
is one of those brewing

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unaccountable concentrations of
power that I see the idea of

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autonomous weapons. I mean, it
used to be that if you wanted to

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have a war, you had to get buy
in from other human beings to do

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it. You could still have Secret
Wars, but it took a hell of a

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lot of work. And in the case of
you know, Iran Contra and stuff,

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things get out because people
either get caught or they talk

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or, but if you get into a
situation where you don't need

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people to conduct war, and this
is this is this could have a

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corrosive effect on the
foundation of democracy is

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really how I look at it. The
idea of being able to automate

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war and again, insect
intelligence, drones really are

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a done deal. They're working on
rat intelligence, drones. Now.

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The idea of swarming all of
these things. They're so

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limited. Speaking of
intelligence, here comes my cat.

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A swarm of cats. Oh, no, it's

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very a swarm of cats. My God.
Run for your life. Hey, Lucy,

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what's up? So anyway? Hey, what
are you doing? I'm talking. So

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if she's on camera, I know
better than to try to stop

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it wouldn't it wouldn't be the
first time a cat has appeared on

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the show. Trust me this let's
face

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it. 40% of the video online is
Kenya's cats exactly the

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internet was built, the cat

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is sitting there thinking, Hey,
that's my gig. What do you do

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and get out of the way human?
But in the book, you just

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mentioned that there is I trying
to think was that it? Was it a

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call back to Roman times. But
there is a whole passage about

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how once you can remove the
humans from the equation, then

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you've really got a great war
machine. What What was that

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piece? Again, I can't I can't
remember off the top of my head.

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It was basically the idea of
harkening back to the Middle

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Ages that

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were the knights and the sword.
Yeah. Would you mind telling us

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that? Because that was a
beautiful

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piece? Absolutely. And it's
interesting, you bring that up,

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because that was really a
pivotal aspect of the book for

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me, so good for you? Well,

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I have to admit, I read it, you
know, one of those horrible

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things, I do hear

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that I would do the same. It
helps to illuminate your reading

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of it. But basically, it is that
if we take a look at the

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structure, the distribution of
political power in a society

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where I'm gonna sound really
wonky,

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no, no, no, I love this. You're
right, you're right on my on my

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vibe, man. Totally.

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It is this that if we go back to
the Middle Ages, and look at the

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social structure, and how power
was very much concentrated at

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the top, there was no middle
class, and you had all this vast

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underclass of people who were
just subsisting. And then you

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take a look at how conflict was
resolved. In that society, what

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you see is that the mounted
armored knight was almost

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invulnerable to pretty much any
number of peasants, who had a

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different a much, you know,
almost no meat in their diet and

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a different muscular
musculature. But they also

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knights had armor, and this
armor was so expensive that it

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would cost the equivalent of
what a house does. Now, you had

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war horses, you had constant
training. So it cost a great

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deal of money to keep a mountain
night available to fight for

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you. And so you had this
structure where very few knights

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could exist, but where they
were, they basically had

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absolute power. And that went
straight up through the, you

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know, the medieval social
hierarchy, the way you barons

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and dukes and then kings. And so
it's a very, very narrow period

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of the pyramid at the top. And
this changes when gunpowder

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comes into effect, when you no
longer have to have somebody

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trained for 678 years and have a
privileged background, and

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upbringing as a page and all
that stuff. In order to resolve

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conflicts. You just need to give
a guy a gun, maybe a few hours a

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day or two of training. And
suddenly, anybody who has this

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too, could kill a mounted knight
in armor. And that shifts

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everything suddenly, over time
successive decades. It's how

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many people you bring to the
battlefield determines who wins,

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not who you bring. And so
suddenly, leaders need buy in

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from people at large. They need
people to cooperate like I need

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all you guys out here with a gun
aiming at those guys with a gun.

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And if I don't do

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it, they'll do it. We need you
to be all that you can be. Yeah,

256
00:14:40,380 --> 00:14:41,010
well, yeah.

257
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In an early form. I think it was
on a tapestry in those days.

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Yeah, you can be but no, it was
basically this that if you look

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at the size of battles from the
battle of creasey and Odyssey in

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court on to the Battle of the
Somme and World War One, you can

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see battles Waterloo, they had
they progressively got larger

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and larger and larger and more
people and logistics started to

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become a big issue and
nationalism rises at around this

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time. And it's interesting that
the concept of real nations as

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opposed to individual kingdoms
and regions starts to come into

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play. And then Parliament's and
representative democracy,

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basically, because leaders could
not ignore their people anymore,

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they ignored the mass of people,
they would get killed. So they

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had to cede some power. And so
in some ways, it is technology

270
00:15:25,440 --> 00:15:29,850
and its weapon technology that
made that possible. So what

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we're doing now what we're
seeing is a shift and towards

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centralization of power, because
to some extent, I don't want to

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say a special forces warrior,
because you know, it's not just

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them. But the idea of a an elite
warrior, who has access to a

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data network to air support all
of these things, and autonomous

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drones can pretty much defeat
any number of people opposing

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them in a regular manner. So
again, we've gone back to almost

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almost this mounted night where
if you have access to all of

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those resources, numbers don't
matter. And in many ways, it's

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re centralizing authority and
power. And if we think that the

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way human beings resolve
conflicts, shape society, and I

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do that, that's what makes that
kind of a big concern to me. And

283
00:16:17,850 --> 00:16:20,040
it's something that I don't
think a lot of people are

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00:16:20,040 --> 00:16:22,650
thinking or talking about. It's
in particular, why I wrote this

285
00:16:22,650 --> 00:16:25,020
book on autonomous drones, a lot
of people think, well, it's

286
00:16:25,020 --> 00:16:28,050
about drones, like the Reaper
and the Predator. No, it isn't.

287
00:16:28,050 --> 00:16:31,050
Those are obsolete platforms
right now. They're not even

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00:16:31,050 --> 00:16:34,680
making the predator anymore. And
the idea of remotely controlling

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00:16:34,680 --> 00:16:38,460
a drone, to me, that's really a
limited use thing. I know, that

290
00:16:38,460 --> 00:16:40,830
sounds funny, but we're using
them against largely tribal

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00:16:40,830 --> 00:16:44,280
cultures, if you try to use a
remotely piloted drone against a

292
00:16:44,280 --> 00:16:47,880
more sophisticated adversary,
they'll jam your radio signal,

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00:16:47,880 --> 00:16:50,640
they'll cut it off, we saw what
happened with the archy 170

294
00:16:50,640 --> 00:16:55,440
Sentinel over Iran. And they
essentially disconnected us from

295
00:16:55,440 --> 00:16:59,070
our drone and hijacked it. And
that's the problem with having a

296
00:16:59,070 --> 00:17:01,110
drone that is remotely
controlled. And that's why

297
00:17:01,230 --> 00:17:03,900
there's a lot of pressure to
push that decision making onto

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00:17:03,900 --> 00:17:07,290
the drone itself. And so this is
really what I'm dramatizing in

299
00:17:07,290 --> 00:17:10,620
this book, these that very
accelerated push to make the

300
00:17:10,620 --> 00:17:12,210
machines make more decisions.

301
00:17:12,450 --> 00:17:15,300
So you knew, of course, I'm not
the only smart guy who has

302
00:17:15,300 --> 00:17:18,870
figured this out, particularly
looking at the history. And so

303
00:17:18,900 --> 00:17:22,980
it does seem that this is indeed
this has got to be a big push

304
00:17:23,160 --> 00:17:25,710
them not just perhaps for
drones, although drones make a

305
00:17:25,710 --> 00:17:29,310
lot of sense. It's quite easy to
operate. But for all types of

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00:17:29,340 --> 00:17:31,740
autonomous warfare robots,

307
00:17:31,770 --> 00:17:35,340
yeah. And cyber war as well. So
bots, that will go off and do

308
00:17:35,340 --> 00:17:36,630
software bots, that will go on

309
00:17:36,960 --> 00:17:41,190
the Cyberware. Cyber War thing.
I'm continuously amazed when I

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00:17:41,190 --> 00:17:47,550
hear the generals talk about
this. And was it the guy who was

311
00:17:48,750 --> 00:17:53,310
Major General in Afghanistan
2010, he had all a whole bunch

312
00:17:53,310 --> 00:17:58,080
of cyber warfare going on. But
when you hear how uninformed

313
00:17:58,080 --> 00:18:01,770
they speak about the technology,
they really these guys, they

314
00:18:01,770 --> 00:18:04,470
must have the guys at the bottom
knowing what they're doing. But

315
00:18:04,470 --> 00:18:07,380
the generals know, they really
don't understand what the hell

316
00:18:07,380 --> 00:18:08,730
they're talking about. They
really don't,

317
00:18:09,210 --> 00:18:13,200
quite a few of them don't. But
there are those that do. Take my

318
00:18:13,200 --> 00:18:15,810
word for it, there are some that
get it and whether they they

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00:18:15,810 --> 00:18:20,160
admit that in media or not.
There are some that do.

320
00:18:21,600 --> 00:18:25,620
intelligence agencies especially
do, it's matter of fact, I did

321
00:18:26,400 --> 00:18:29,880
an interview with Michael Hayden
for an article that I eventually

322
00:18:29,880 --> 00:18:33,720
wound up not finishing, but it
was a number where it was it was

323
00:18:33,720 --> 00:18:37,740
at a conference. But in that
article, or in that interview,

324
00:18:37,740 --> 00:18:41,940
he was essentially saying that
when nations around the world

325
00:18:41,940 --> 00:18:46,050
were solicited by a magazine or
a newspaper on who they were

326
00:18:46,050 --> 00:18:48,900
most afraid of on the internet,
the United States was listed as

327
00:18:48,900 --> 00:18:52,440
number one, because we have a
really robust cyber war and

328
00:18:52,440 --> 00:18:56,640
cyber espionage campaign, as has
recently come to light, and as

329
00:18:56,670 --> 00:18:59,850
we've recently admitted, so you
know, a lot of people in the

330
00:18:59,850 --> 00:19:03,210
United States, especially think
of China, and of course, we're

331
00:19:03,240 --> 00:19:06,630
the geopolitical contest has
definitely begun there. But the

332
00:19:06,630 --> 00:19:10,170
United States is very active in
this area. So what's your

333
00:19:11,160 --> 00:19:13,500
what's your feeling about All
right, John, you're pacifist,

334
00:19:13,500 --> 00:19:16,140
or? I mean, where do you stand?

335
00:19:16,860 --> 00:19:19,920
I would definitely say I'm not a
pacifist. I'm a realist. I

336
00:19:19,920 --> 00:19:24,240
understand that when it comes to
nations, geopolitics, and the

337
00:19:24,240 --> 00:19:28,260
great game that happens, and
that power is always sought by

338
00:19:28,260 --> 00:19:31,710
those who have a will to power.
And the best way to avoid real

339
00:19:31,710 --> 00:19:36,180
trouble is to try to distribute
power among a reasonable number

340
00:19:36,180 --> 00:19:38,610
of people. And I think our
founding fathers have this

341
00:19:38,610 --> 00:19:41,220
principle, the idea of checks
and balances. And it's really

342
00:19:41,220 --> 00:19:43,530
that's what I look at. I don't
think in the main, we're ever

343
00:19:43,530 --> 00:19:46,830
going to make things perfect, or
even close to it. But that's the

344
00:19:46,830 --> 00:19:49,470
best you can do. I think if you
have branches of government and

345
00:19:49,470 --> 00:19:54,060
individuals who share power,
that's best. It's when we start

346
00:19:54,060 --> 00:19:57,330
to see this lockstep collusion
or secrecy that allows conflicts

347
00:19:57,330 --> 00:20:00,360
to occur in secrecy without
anybody having a have any

348
00:20:00,360 --> 00:20:02,760
knowledge of it or even the
right to know? That's when I

349
00:20:02,760 --> 00:20:06,450
think things get dangerous? So
am I a pacifist? No, if if we

350
00:20:06,450 --> 00:20:10,380
were attacked, I want us to
strike back. But I'm not

351
00:20:10,380 --> 00:20:13,530
convinced that's what we're
doing. Now. I am also somewhat

352
00:20:13,530 --> 00:20:17,370
concerned that what we're doing
now is self defeating. I mean, I

353
00:20:17,370 --> 00:20:20,370
touch upon this a bit in the
book and through the biologists

354
00:20:20,370 --> 00:20:23,820
character, the idea that
cooperating organisms succeed

355
00:20:23,820 --> 00:20:26,070
better than those that are
constantly in Darwinian

356
00:20:26,070 --> 00:20:30,750
conflict. This has a lot to do
with Alfred Russell's concepts

357
00:20:30,780 --> 00:20:35,100
about evolution, and natural
selection that many, many

358
00:20:35,100 --> 00:20:38,100
organisms don't just kill each
other. They cooperate in a

359
00:20:38,100 --> 00:20:40,680
symbiotic way with each other,
and they thrive for that, right.

360
00:20:40,680 --> 00:20:41,670
Except for humans.

361
00:20:42,150 --> 00:20:45,900
Well, you know, we do cooperate.
We do we kill each other, too.

362
00:20:45,900 --> 00:20:50,280
We do. But again, it's not all
or nothing. It's not a binary

363
00:20:50,280 --> 00:20:52,710
equation. Right? Yeah, I've laid
I'll tell you, we've gotten

364
00:20:52,710 --> 00:20:56,550
really good at that. And, and I
do think there is a more

365
00:20:57,120 --> 00:21:00,600
mainstream movement to try to
get more sustainable, to make

366
00:21:00,600 --> 00:21:03,210
things more local and
comprehensible. And so I'm an

367
00:21:03,210 --> 00:21:08,070
optimist. I'm definitely not a
pacifist, I'm not a hawk, I'm

368
00:21:08,070 --> 00:21:10,410
kind of right about in the
middle. Like, I understand that

369
00:21:10,410 --> 00:21:14,190
people are this way that we're
kind of like shaved apes in a

370
00:21:14,190 --> 00:21:17,220
way for trying to shake off
this, you know, we're only

371
00:21:17,220 --> 00:21:21,390
recently have the capability
technologically to really do

372
00:21:21,390 --> 00:21:23,970
serious harm to the entire
planet. And we're trying to get

373
00:21:23,970 --> 00:21:27,630
our heads wrapped around that.
And so I think if more people

374
00:21:27,630 --> 00:21:30,810
have their hand on the tiller,
we're less likely to go

375
00:21:30,840 --> 00:21:34,140
definitively in a bad direction.
We'll kind of ambulator around

376
00:21:34,140 --> 00:21:35,880
for a while. But hopefully,
we'll work it out.

377
00:21:35,910 --> 00:21:40,290
So the real futures view in the
book, which you can, at this

378
00:21:40,290 --> 00:21:42,900
point, probably call science
fiction. But yeah, for how long?

379
00:21:43,020 --> 00:21:46,890
Yes, right, is the fact that
when you have autonomy, coming

380
00:21:46,890 --> 00:21:50,490
into the picture, particularly
with the drones is no longer

381
00:21:50,520 --> 00:21:53,640
which country is the biggest
badass, but which company is the

382
00:21:53,640 --> 00:21:56,760
biggest badass because you're
individual, or individual, all

383
00:21:56,760 --> 00:21:59,820
you need is money. And once you
have the money, then you can

384
00:21:59,820 --> 00:22:03,630
basically you could create a war
when it and no one would know

385
00:22:03,630 --> 00:22:06,390
who the hell you are. And you
could have anything go the way

386
00:22:06,390 --> 00:22:08,220
you want it to go. And that I
think, to me, that was the

387
00:22:08,220 --> 00:22:10,920
message like, oh, wow, we've
been just looking at, and we

388
00:22:10,920 --> 00:22:14,190
have a president who apparently,
you know, loves to use drones

389
00:22:14,340 --> 00:22:18,720
loves to view the tapes. You
know, now we have countries all

390
00:22:18,720 --> 00:22:21,780
over the world. And on local
level, we have in the United

391
00:22:21,780 --> 00:22:24,750
States, of course, police
forces, and you know, all of

392
00:22:24,750 --> 00:22:28,980
this will be opened up in 2015.
But that's nothing. That's

393
00:22:28,980 --> 00:22:31,800
nothing compared to you know,
someone who has a big pile of

394
00:22:31,800 --> 00:22:34,920
cash with an agenda, they can
just get in the game whenever

395
00:22:34,920 --> 00:22:35,490
they want.

396
00:22:35,670 --> 00:22:39,210
And especially if they either
have no history of respect for

397
00:22:39,210 --> 00:22:42,780
human rights, or they just
definitively do not care.

398
00:22:42,840 --> 00:22:45,090
Because at that point is
completely optional. If people

399
00:22:45,090 --> 00:22:48,060
were upset about what you're
doing, and you don't care,

400
00:22:48,240 --> 00:22:52,230
again, it it really, in some
ways empowers authoritarianism.

401
00:22:52,590 --> 00:22:56,220
And that's, that's what concern
me. So again, I'm optimistic in

402
00:22:56,220 --> 00:22:59,670
the sense that I sort of look at
what I do, in terms of writing

403
00:22:59,670 --> 00:23:02,670
thrillers as looking out for
iceberg, because I like

404
00:23:02,670 --> 00:23:04,710
technology. I mean, it's
perfect. I love it, I made my

405
00:23:04,710 --> 00:23:08,970
whole career on it. It's just
that, you know, you want to keep

406
00:23:08,970 --> 00:23:11,340
an eye ahead and say, oh, let's
turn a little to the right,

407
00:23:11,340 --> 00:23:13,800
let's turn a little to the left.
That doesn't mean abandon all,

408
00:23:13,830 --> 00:23:18,180
you know, technology means just
try to think ahead. We've done

409
00:23:18,180 --> 00:23:21,060
this in the past, we invented
technologies that caused us

410
00:23:21,060 --> 00:23:25,590
problems. And we have tried to
deal with them nuclear,

411
00:23:25,620 --> 00:23:28,830
biological, chemical weapons.
They were going to be world

412
00:23:28,830 --> 00:23:32,970
killers. Pardon me. They were
going to wipe out the human

413
00:23:32,970 --> 00:23:36,900
race, but we created
international treaties. And as

414
00:23:36,900 --> 00:23:39,420
imperfect as they are, we're
still here. I mean, these are

415
00:23:39,420 --> 00:23:42,390
weapons that by all rights,
really should have wiped us out

416
00:23:42,390 --> 00:23:46,410
if we were, you know, crazy,
right? So I think in the main,

417
00:23:46,410 --> 00:23:48,540
we're sort of like a bell curve.
Most people just don't want to

418
00:23:48,540 --> 00:23:51,090
get through their day raise
their kids, right. And that's

419
00:23:51,090 --> 00:23:53,970
what's going to save us is the
fact that most of us have our

420
00:23:53,970 --> 00:23:57,570
hands go down at least semi
straight, right. And as long as

421
00:23:57,570 --> 00:24:01,110
we can start to build things and
get through our day, we'll be

422
00:24:01,110 --> 00:24:04,230
fine. It's when you allow just a
few people to completely upset

423
00:24:04,230 --> 00:24:06,540
everything. And that's why you
want to try to avoid these

424
00:24:06,540 --> 00:24:10,650
concentrations of power and
lethal autonomy, as it's called

425
00:24:10,650 --> 00:24:13,830
the idea of robots making
killing decisions. That is

426
00:24:13,830 --> 00:24:16,080
definitely one of the
centralizing things that I don't

427
00:24:16,080 --> 00:24:18,840
think a democracy should ever
allow. I don't think we should

428
00:24:18,840 --> 00:24:22,560
ever allow machines to make a
decision to kill people. Now.

429
00:24:22,620 --> 00:24:26,160
Now, let me parse that I don't
mean, we would never send a

430
00:24:26,160 --> 00:24:28,950
machine specifically like a
targeted munition to do

431
00:24:28,950 --> 00:24:32,730
something that's different than
sending machine into this area

432
00:24:32,760 --> 00:24:36,600
to terrorize it. In order to try
to maintain order and decide who

433
00:24:36,600 --> 00:24:40,230
lives and who dies. That's a
very different thing. And you

434
00:24:40,230 --> 00:24:44,400
will see that I think in
authoritarian nations, sooner

435
00:24:44,430 --> 00:24:48,150
than later or in conflict zones
or narco trafficking zones,

436
00:24:48,330 --> 00:24:51,240
basically where people are
grasping for power and have some

437
00:24:51,240 --> 00:24:53,190
money, you're going to see them
first.

438
00:24:53,340 --> 00:24:55,650
Well, I think, personally, I
believe that there's going to be

439
00:24:55,650 --> 00:24:59,010
an even bigger call for really
ace pilots because we're going

440
00:24:59,010 --> 00:25:01,350
to have to be be up there
defending because, you know, at

441
00:25:01,350 --> 00:25:04,650
a certain point, I think a human
is still for a long time going

442
00:25:04,650 --> 00:25:10,140
to be better than some machine
that has performance limitations

443
00:25:10,140 --> 00:25:10,800
perhaps,

444
00:25:11,280 --> 00:25:14,760
or mental limitation in getting
into brass tacks though, because

445
00:25:14,760 --> 00:25:17,550
this is great, because now I'm
talking to a pilot, somebody

446
00:25:17,550 --> 00:25:22,500
who, and so not to be just
devil's advocate, but the thing

447
00:25:22,500 --> 00:25:25,410
that concerns me there is what
do you as a pilot do against a

448
00:25:25,410 --> 00:25:29,100
swarm? Where the individual
members of that swarm don't give

449
00:25:29,100 --> 00:25:30,750
a damn whether they survive or
not?

450
00:25:30,870 --> 00:25:33,780
Right? Well, so of course, we
already had this kind of, if you

451
00:25:33,780 --> 00:25:37,470
look at the Japanese zeros we
had, and suicide bombers, you

452
00:25:37,470 --> 00:25:40,740
know, in general, that, of
course, is a problem. But I

453
00:25:40,740 --> 00:25:44,070
mean, in my head, I'm seeing,
you know, Independence Day, I'm

454
00:25:44,070 --> 00:25:46,320
seeing Star Wars I'm seeing
there's just all this crap

455
00:25:46,320 --> 00:25:50,430
coming at you. And you just got
to spray and pray as many

456
00:25:50,430 --> 00:25:54,540
evasive maneuvers as possible.
But just from a cost

457
00:25:54,540 --> 00:26:00,150
perspective, there's going to be
maneuverability issues. That

458
00:26:00,150 --> 00:26:00,810
just won't.

459
00:26:01,170 --> 00:26:03,270
Yeah, they're not going to be
able to pull 20 G's.

460
00:26:03,330 --> 00:26:08,250
No, well, no, I don't think so.
No, I not the pilots are great

461
00:26:08,250 --> 00:26:16,800
at that. But it's so let's just
hope it doesn't get to that. Put

462
00:26:16,800 --> 00:26:18,180
me in the machine. I'm
available.

463
00:26:18,720 --> 00:26:22,410
Word shot. I will say this,
though, the thing that I think

464
00:26:22,410 --> 00:26:24,870
we need to be doing is
developing a legal framework

465
00:26:25,530 --> 00:26:28,890
extend the kind of moral
framework and a moral ethical

466
00:26:28,890 --> 00:26:32,130
framework. Absolutely. Right.
And I always say that it's

467
00:26:32,130 --> 00:26:35,910
because what would inspire
leaders, international leaders

468
00:26:35,910 --> 00:26:39,090
to do this is they are liable to
be the prime targets of these.

469
00:26:39,959 --> 00:26:43,049
By the way, we've got a drone
with your name on it right

470
00:26:43,709 --> 00:26:45,869
there. DEVOTEE, I want to get
back to the book for a second,

471
00:26:45,869 --> 00:26:50,879
because besides the topic, etc.
Your characters are beautifully

472
00:26:50,909 --> 00:26:55,469
developed. I think that's the
first time you've had a female

473
00:26:55,469 --> 00:26:57,779
protagonist. Great job.

474
00:26:57,810 --> 00:27:01,860
I had a Phillips in demon. She
was one of many protagonist.

475
00:27:02,280 --> 00:27:04,890
Right. You know, I took some
lumps from people who thought I

476
00:27:04,890 --> 00:27:08,670
was misogynist, which confused
me because I'm really not. Yeah,

477
00:27:08,670 --> 00:27:09,840
no, I thought well, okay.

478
00:27:10,620 --> 00:27:13,830
She had the relationship where
there were their dad, if I can

479
00:27:13,830 --> 00:27:14,760
remember correctly,

480
00:27:14,820 --> 00:27:17,220
like a talented until I mean,
she was the most brilliant

481
00:27:17,220 --> 00:27:21,510
person there was, of course,
yeah. But I did like the idea of

482
00:27:21,510 --> 00:27:25,920
having someone who had more of
a, you know, well, let's put it

483
00:27:25,920 --> 00:27:28,830
this way less of the he-man
attitude. And I really wanted

484
00:27:28,830 --> 00:27:30,240
that to soften the edge of the
story

485
00:27:30,270 --> 00:27:34,050
yet throughout the whole thing.
She's sexy. I mean, I'm just

486
00:27:34,050 --> 00:27:37,710
feeling for being really, really
sexy, good. And you even put a

487
00:27:37,710 --> 00:27:40,200
sexing in for me, which is my
favorite part of any book like,

488
00:27:40,200 --> 00:27:41,280
Yeah, finally, we

489
00:27:41,280 --> 00:27:43,080
get some really wow, write these
things.

490
00:27:45,120 --> 00:27:48,720
But you're writing really is
outstanding. And I've always

491
00:27:48,720 --> 00:27:53,070
been a big fan of writers and
other professions, lawyers.

492
00:27:53,610 --> 00:27:56,310
We've had several on the show,
we're trying to be excellent

493
00:27:56,340 --> 00:28:02,580
writers of fiction. When so you,
you, of course, know how to

494
00:28:02,580 --> 00:28:06,450
write code, which a lot of
people think is just some kind

495
00:28:06,450 --> 00:28:09,210
of thing. You go to school, you
learn it, and it's like, Oh, and

496
00:28:09,210 --> 00:28:13,590
here's how it works. No, you can
write code just as poorly as a

497
00:28:13,590 --> 00:28:16,800
crappy book. You can write
yourself into corners, you can

498
00:28:16,830 --> 00:28:19,200
do all that. And you can
approach the problem from many,

499
00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:23,580
many directions. None of them
necessarily right or wrong. So

500
00:28:23,610 --> 00:28:27,750
when you were when you started
writing, did, did you approach

501
00:28:27,750 --> 00:28:31,080
it from a software perspective?
Were there any analogies in

502
00:28:31,080 --> 00:28:33,600
that? Or? I mean, I just love to
know your process.

503
00:28:33,840 --> 00:28:37,470
So So then we're going back to
demon, which is a book I wrote

504
00:28:37,470 --> 00:28:42,780
between 2002 and 2004. I
actually wrote that book as a

505
00:28:42,780 --> 00:28:46,410
result of some software I've
written. Hmm. So yes, the answer

506
00:28:46,410 --> 00:28:46,740
is very

507
00:28:46,740 --> 00:28:49,530
much elaborate on the software.
Yeah, sure. I'm

508
00:28:49,530 --> 00:28:53,940
getting peek out now. I'll
establish my geek cred. I wrote

509
00:28:53,940 --> 00:28:57,180
a software. So you know, at the
time, you know, was after the

510
00:28:57,180 --> 00:29:00,480
y2k remediation thing in
the.com, boom, we had started

511
00:29:00,510 --> 00:29:03,810
easing up. Now, I never really
got involved in that I was

512
00:29:03,810 --> 00:29:07,410
always a data guy. So. But
nonetheless, my business slowed

513
00:29:07,410 --> 00:29:09,780
down a little at the time. And I
started thinking, you know, I

514
00:29:09,780 --> 00:29:11,880
want to take a little time and
do something that would be

515
00:29:11,880 --> 00:29:14,430
interesting to me. I wanted to
create some software, some

516
00:29:14,430 --> 00:29:18,240
custom software, and I was a
gamer for a while, you know,

517
00:29:18,270 --> 00:29:21,420
everything from video games,
d&d, and stuff like that. And I

518
00:29:21,420 --> 00:29:24,870
always wanted to automate this
weather system that I'd created

519
00:29:24,870 --> 00:29:27,150
for my game. So this is an a
role playing game weather

520
00:29:27,150 --> 00:29:30,090
system. But of course, I
wouldn't just do a simple

521
00:29:30,090 --> 00:29:33,480
weather system, I have to do one
that has an orbital mechanics

522
00:29:33,480 --> 00:29:36,840
model module in it, not all this
stuff. So you could say, Hey,

523
00:29:36,990 --> 00:29:39,810
you tell me what the size of
your world is what its orbital

524
00:29:39,840 --> 00:29:43,830
eccentricity is its access tilt.
And I'll tell you when the sun

525
00:29:43,830 --> 00:29:46,800
or sun's rising set wherever you
are, every day of the year

526
00:29:46,800 --> 00:29:49,830
where, you know, I just went to
town it was like the most. If

527
00:29:49,830 --> 00:29:52,920
you go out on the web, you could
see people talking about I think

528
00:29:52,920 --> 00:29:56,250
it's been bit torn to two. It's
called WeatherMaster. Right? So

529
00:29:56,250 --> 00:30:01,560
I write this program, and I I
get further or elaborate with I

530
00:30:01,560 --> 00:30:04,650
put a patent polymorphic
encryption wrapper around it so

531
00:30:04,650 --> 00:30:08,250
that you can try it for 30 days.
And at that point, it re

532
00:30:08,250 --> 00:30:10,740
encrypts itself. So you can buy
it online. This is like, you

533
00:30:10,740 --> 00:30:14,100
know, again, around the year
2000, something like that. And

534
00:30:14,100 --> 00:30:17,100
what happened was I got pulled
into a project. And a couple

535
00:30:17,100 --> 00:30:20,340
months later, I come back. And
it turns out this thing is

536
00:30:20,340 --> 00:30:22,860
selling in like 38 countries
around the world, people are

537
00:30:22,860 --> 00:30:25,410
trying it and buying it. And
there's like this money there in

538
00:30:25,410 --> 00:30:28,710
this account that I had set up.
And I had it set up to pay for

539
00:30:28,710 --> 00:30:31,050
the website for some
advertising. So it was sort of

540
00:30:31,050 --> 00:30:34,770
like this automated thing. And I
started thinking, wow, I got hit

541
00:30:34,770 --> 00:30:38,490
by a bus, this thing would just
keep going. And then I started

542
00:30:38,490 --> 00:30:41,880
thinking, Well, what else can
you do if you're dead? In modern

543
00:30:41,880 --> 00:30:45,780
society? It turns out, you can
do like 70% of the stuff you

544
00:30:45,780 --> 00:30:47,220
normally do, for us

545
00:30:47,220 --> 00:30:51,210
is exactly the the core nucleus
of the book. That's fantastic.

546
00:30:51,240 --> 00:30:54,600
You can see. So it came from
software in a very literal way.

547
00:30:54,600 --> 00:30:57,780
I was like, wow. And that was
really the core of the book, as

548
00:30:57,780 --> 00:31:01,500
you said that you have a
designer of a massively parallel

549
00:31:01,500 --> 00:31:05,550
online game, who creates a
program, like keeps an eye out

550
00:31:05,550 --> 00:31:09,180
for the appearance of his own
obituary online, at which point

551
00:31:09,180 --> 00:31:13,710
all sorts of things start taking
to start to execute and start to

552
00:31:13,710 --> 00:31:17,010
tear the fabric of society
apart. So yeah, that's where

553
00:31:17,010 --> 00:31:20,220
that came from. And in terms of
the plotting and design of a

554
00:31:20,220 --> 00:31:23,970
thriller, I guess, I do follow a
software model only because I

555
00:31:23,970 --> 00:31:29,910
try Well, I guess, if you write
code long enough, in a, in a

556
00:31:29,910 --> 00:31:33,210
corporate environment, at least
a one where you have really good

557
00:31:33,210 --> 00:31:35,850
quality teams, there's some
pressure to make lean,

558
00:31:35,850 --> 00:31:39,510
maintainable code. And to some
extent, I like to think that

559
00:31:39,510 --> 00:31:44,520
carries over into my writing. I
try not to have lots of

560
00:31:44,520 --> 00:31:47,370
extraneous details, I try to
have what I need there, and to

561
00:31:47,370 --> 00:31:50,760
propel the story forward. And
what I'm told is that my stories

562
00:31:50,760 --> 00:31:54,300
do propel people forward. So I
feel I might have succeeded at

563
00:31:54,300 --> 00:31:59,100
that. We'll see. But I do follow
some of the skills that I picked

564
00:31:59,100 --> 00:32:04,230
up in, in writing clean code, I
think, help help in that regard.

565
00:32:04,230 --> 00:32:06,360
And certainly, in terms of
structure structure is very

566
00:32:06,360 --> 00:32:10,410
important to me in a story in
terms of pacing, different

567
00:32:10,410 --> 00:32:12,750
threads. So yeah, I guess my
stories are multi threaded,

568
00:32:13,020 --> 00:32:16,020
multi threaded. So yeah, I would
say yes. what's your

569
00:32:16,050 --> 00:32:18,570
what's your IDE for writing your
books?

570
00:32:20,010 --> 00:32:24,870
That's right. Yeah, what I emacs
is this plugin? No, it's

571
00:32:25,770 --> 00:32:28,050
I that would have been, you
would have blown me away if that

572
00:32:28,050 --> 00:32:28,650
were true.

573
00:32:30,270 --> 00:32:31,650
No, I don't.

574
00:32:32,639 --> 00:32:35,549
I'll tell you though, if you
wrote one, if you wrote a plugin

575
00:32:35,549 --> 00:32:37,679
for Emacs, it would sell like
crazy.

576
00:32:39,060 --> 00:32:42,120
It would be so ridiculous,
because it's like it's this like

577
00:32:42,120 --> 00:32:46,530
front end to Notepad,
essentially. But it highlights

578
00:32:46,530 --> 00:32:49,230
your colors of your character.
Of course, of course, you go

579
00:32:49,260 --> 00:32:52,860
like everybody, I don't even get
me started. I got you thinking,

580
00:32:52,860 --> 00:32:54,990
didn't I wasted six months of my
time? Thank

581
00:32:57,060 --> 00:32:58,920
you just a word guy, or how did
you do

582
00:32:59,460 --> 00:33:03,150
actually have an English
Literature degree? I don't have

583
00:33:03,150 --> 00:33:06,180
a computer science degree. So I
got involved in computers in the

584
00:33:06,180 --> 00:33:10,920
early 90s 9091, something like
that back in the day, when you

585
00:33:10,920 --> 00:33:13,320
could do things in a
corporation, because people

586
00:33:13,320 --> 00:33:17,760
didn't take data and the
Internet especially seriously at

587
00:33:17,760 --> 00:33:21,480
all. And so if you started
connecting sites and moving data

588
00:33:21,510 --> 00:33:25,410
around in the unofficial way,
but you got things done, you

589
00:33:25,410 --> 00:33:28,470
just got more authority and more
access and more promotions. And

590
00:33:28,710 --> 00:33:31,020
I look at things now. I mean,
sure, I later got

591
00:33:31,020 --> 00:33:35,730
certifications, and all sorts of
things. But I laugh now because

592
00:33:35,730 --> 00:33:40,350
I wonder since people going for
it jobs, their their resumes are

593
00:33:40,350 --> 00:33:43,620
scanned, automatically looking
for keywords and certifications.

594
00:33:44,460 --> 00:33:46,530
I mean, I've really great
experience building huge

595
00:33:46,530 --> 00:33:49,080
systems. But I wonder if I would
have been able to easily get my

596
00:33:49,080 --> 00:33:52,290
start today. Because again, on
paper when I was starting out, I

597
00:33:52,290 --> 00:33:54,900
was an English literature guy
who had a real passion for tech.

598
00:33:54,900 --> 00:33:57,720
And I always used to mess around
with paradox databases and stuff

599
00:33:57,720 --> 00:34:02,130
like that coding. And I don't
know that it's easy to just

600
00:34:02,160 --> 00:34:04,650
dabble around. And some of the
most interesting people that

601
00:34:04,650 --> 00:34:07,620
I've met in tech in Silicon
Valley, very successful people

602
00:34:07,740 --> 00:34:09,600
don't have a straight

603
00:34:09,929 --> 00:34:12,809
computer science background, but
bass players.

604
00:34:13,290 --> 00:34:17,250
Yeah, yeah. Only musicians, bass
player, mathematical models.

605
00:34:17,280 --> 00:34:20,940
Yep. And that type of
mathematical mind really serves

606
00:34:20,940 --> 00:34:22,470
you in good stead in software
design.

607
00:34:22,980 --> 00:34:26,850
So is this is this really your
your main vocation writing? Is

608
00:34:26,850 --> 00:34:29,130
that what you're doing? You're
still consulting stuff on the

609
00:34:29,130 --> 00:34:32,820
side? Or that mean? Is there
enough money in books today?

610
00:34:32,820 --> 00:34:34,290
Still, can you still make it?
You know, I'm

611
00:34:34,440 --> 00:34:39,120
very fortunate. I had to to book
deals with Dutton that were very

612
00:34:39,120 --> 00:34:43,020
good. And, you know, demon. I
think at this point, it's been

613
00:34:43,020 --> 00:34:46,530
translated into 18 languages.
Because a film deal with

614
00:34:46,530 --> 00:34:50,160
Paramount stuff like so I've
been I've been doing pretty well

615
00:34:50,160 --> 00:34:51,150
so far. I

616
00:34:51,600 --> 00:34:55,590
put the brakes on film deal with
Paramount back it up. What are

617
00:34:55,590 --> 00:34:56,220
we talking?

618
00:34:56,370 --> 00:35:01,140
Sure. Yeah. Actually, what's
funny is Hey, backup the demon

619
00:35:01,140 --> 00:35:04,470
again. I couldn't get demon
published, or self published,

620
00:35:04,470 --> 00:35:07,290
right? So initially Yeah. And of
course it again I made it a big

621
00:35:07,320 --> 00:35:09,630
technology product project
because you know, I couldn't

622
00:35:09,630 --> 00:35:12,060
just self publish it and hand it
over to somebody I'm like no,

623
00:35:12,210 --> 00:35:14,910
I'm going to typeset it and I'm
going to adjust the kerning

624
00:35:14,940 --> 00:35:17,010
Yes, kerning lovely. Yeah,

625
00:35:17,880 --> 00:35:21,390
I did the cover in Photoshop,
all that stuff. And being a

626
00:35:21,390 --> 00:35:26,250
logistics software guy, I didn't
want any middle men between me.

627
00:35:26,250 --> 00:35:28,800
So of course, I went right to
the source lighting source,

628
00:35:28,800 --> 00:35:31,530
which is a company that other
publishing companies use anyway,

629
00:35:31,530 --> 00:35:36,420
long story short, I, I basically
made it a technology project and

630
00:35:36,420 --> 00:35:41,310
then got the book out there on
Amazon, as probably 2006. And

631
00:35:41,310 --> 00:35:44,700
then people and I started
reaching out to people, tech

632
00:35:44,700 --> 00:35:47,250
bloggers and tech journalists
who had read for many years, and

633
00:35:47,250 --> 00:35:49,770
I could demonstrate a knowledge
of what they've done. And I just

634
00:35:49,770 --> 00:35:52,320
said, I want to send you this
book, you can throw it away or

635
00:35:52,320 --> 00:35:54,870
use it to level a coffee table,
whatever you want to do, but

636
00:35:55,350 --> 00:35:58,620
just wanted to say thanks. And
actually, by doing that light

637
00:35:58,620 --> 00:36:02,160
touch, I got a probably 30% of
the people writing back and say,

638
00:36:02,160 --> 00:36:04,470
hey, yeah, I read it, I really
liked it. And they passed it on

639
00:36:04,470 --> 00:36:06,750
to others, and eventually got
into Microsoft, and Google and

640
00:36:06,750 --> 00:36:09,060
all these other companies, it
started to take off. So the

641
00:36:09,060 --> 00:36:12,330
funny part of that is, I got a
film deal before I even got a

642
00:36:12,360 --> 00:36:16,290
publishing contract, a really
old call from Walter parks.

643
00:36:16,500 --> 00:36:19,950
First World Walter parks co
wrote war games, like a seminal

644
00:36:19,950 --> 00:36:23,520
film, for me, one of the reasons
I really was interested in tech.

645
00:36:24,150 --> 00:36:26,100
So it's funny when you get a
phone call from somebody like

646
00:36:26,100 --> 00:36:29,160
that, because the first thing
you say is bullshit. Clear,

647
00:36:29,490 --> 00:36:32,940
having to get me out exactly.
And then finally, it was made

648
00:36:32,970 --> 00:36:37,380
aware to me that he was actually
the guy. And we started

649
00:36:37,380 --> 00:36:41,520
negotiating a film deal. And it
was at that point that I think I

650
00:36:41,520 --> 00:36:44,250
got into Wired Magazine. And
then Good lord, everybody

651
00:36:44,250 --> 00:36:47,730
started coming out of the
woodwork, started selling 1000s

652
00:36:47,730 --> 00:36:50,100
and 1000s, I was already selling
1000s of copies, but I started

653
00:36:50,100 --> 00:36:54,120
selling many more. And that's
how I got the mainstream

654
00:36:54,180 --> 00:36:57,300
publishing contract was done. So
I got a two book deal there. I

655
00:36:57,300 --> 00:37:01,140
wrote demon and freedom TM. And
now I've got a second two book

656
00:37:01,140 --> 00:37:04,020
deal Kill Decision as the first
one that I've got one more book

657
00:37:04,020 --> 00:37:08,430
I'm writing on working on that.
So I'm interested in tech,

658
00:37:08,430 --> 00:37:10,770
though I am interested in
getting back involved. I have

659
00:37:10,770 --> 00:37:13,950
not consulted in a number of
years, probably three or four

660
00:37:13,950 --> 00:37:17,910
years now, or four years. And
I'm interested in games to

661
00:37:17,970 --> 00:37:22,650
write. So can you can you tell
us what you're waiting? The next

662
00:37:22,650 --> 00:37:25,080
book will be about? You know
what it is?

663
00:37:25,169 --> 00:37:29,069
I rule that I don't discuss
projects I'm working on? I don't

664
00:37:29,069 --> 00:37:31,679
know. It's almost superstition?
No, that's cool. That's totally

665
00:37:31,679 --> 00:37:35,849
cool. It keeps this this energy.
Like if you start talking about

666
00:37:35,849 --> 00:37:36,119
a book.

667
00:37:39,690 --> 00:37:43,320
Too much anticipation. So but on
the Paramount do I mean, has

668
00:37:43,320 --> 00:37:46,530
there been any form of green
lights flashing anywhere? I

669
00:37:46,530 --> 00:37:49,440
mean, it's been a while now, is
this moving forward? Is Angelina

670
00:37:49,440 --> 00:37:50,520
Jolie going to be in it?

671
00:37:51,090 --> 00:37:53,880
I don't know. And this is this
is what I discovered. Now,

672
00:37:53,880 --> 00:37:56,370
having gone through this whole
Hollywood experience is that

673
00:37:57,600 --> 00:38:00,660
once once it goes into
Hollywood's large intestine, you

674
00:38:00,660 --> 00:38:02,430
just sort of have to wait big
box.

675
00:38:02,430 --> 00:38:02,880
Right.

676
00:38:04,110 --> 00:38:07,230
Right. And I'm told that there's
really only a couple of authors

677
00:38:07,230 --> 00:38:10,890
like on Earth who have any
significant input. What is the

678
00:38:10,920 --> 00:38:17,940
probably Dan Brown, and god I
can't believe Harry Potter Harry

679
00:38:17,940 --> 00:38:21,930
Potter. You Yeah, yeah. I think
I've listed all of them right

680
00:38:21,930 --> 00:38:24,720
there. That's to probably have
significant input. But I'm what

681
00:38:24,720 --> 00:38:27,720
goes on in Hollywood. But to
know, I don't have any news, I

682
00:38:27,720 --> 00:38:28,230
don't know.

683
00:38:28,410 --> 00:38:31,110
Well, it would obviously be
great be great for you. But

684
00:38:31,140 --> 00:38:37,740
personally, being a real lover
of books. I don't. I have

685
00:38:37,740 --> 00:38:41,580
everything in my mind's eye and
and you do a great job with your

686
00:38:41,580 --> 00:38:44,850
writing and really painting a
picture, which is really, really

687
00:38:44,850 --> 00:38:47,370
awesome. And, and I really
appreciate all the time you've

688
00:38:47,370 --> 00:38:49,650
taken with us today. I know
this, for me has been highly

689
00:38:49,650 --> 00:38:53,910
anticipated. Because I really,
really like your writing. And I

690
00:38:53,910 --> 00:38:57,900
hope this just does dynamite for
you. And and you know, it's not

691
00:38:57,900 --> 00:39:01,890
just a great book, but it could
save the world. So you know, get

692
00:39:01,890 --> 00:39:05,760
some consideration here for
killed that. Yeah. For Kill

693
00:39:05,760 --> 00:39:08,550
Decision. Daniel, thank you
again for all your time. I

694
00:39:08,550 --> 00:39:09,870
really appreciate it.

695
00:39:09,960 --> 00:39:11,790
Oh, this is a lot of fun. Adam,
thank you.

696
00:39:14,610 --> 00:39:18,300
Daniel Suarez, their interview
that I did with him a couple

697
00:39:18,300 --> 00:39:21,840
months ago before the release of
his book, Kill Decision. And

698
00:39:22,470 --> 00:39:24,180
nice guy. Nice guy.

699
00:39:24,210 --> 00:39:25,530
Yeah, that's a good interview
too.

700
00:39:25,650 --> 00:39:27,870
Thank you. You don't handle high
energy.

701
00:39:28,140 --> 00:39:31,200
Your energy was higher back in
the day. Yeah. Well, I was.

702
00:39:31,530 --> 00:39:34,050
I was probably high and you're
all jacked

703
00:39:34,050 --> 00:39:37,800
up. That this is long after you
stop smoking. Yeah, no.

704
00:39:37,860 --> 00:39:40,290
And besides that, smoking
doesn't make you high it

705
00:39:40,290 --> 00:39:43,920
actually makes you low. So so
we're recording this we're kind

706
00:39:43,920 --> 00:39:47,580
of on We are of course, pre
recording this to to make this

707
00:39:47,610 --> 00:39:52,800
nice little interview show, as
I'm still in Europe. And we have

708
00:39:52,800 --> 00:39:56,100
one more interview coming up.
And and then after that, we'll

709
00:39:56,100 --> 00:39:59,520
be back again live on Thursday.
We do want to remind everybody

710
00:39:59,760 --> 00:40:02,040
that we We still need your
support. We need executive

711
00:40:02,040 --> 00:40:04,230
producers, Associate Executive
producers, you'll get full

712
00:40:04,230 --> 00:40:06,960
credit in the show notes for
this episode. But also, we'll

713
00:40:06,960 --> 00:40:09,990
thank you on the Thursday live
show on August 1,

714
00:40:10,080 --> 00:40:15,810
right is to go to dvorak.org/n.
A and help us out there also

715
00:40:15,810 --> 00:40:20,610
Devorah child of arc.com/n a no
agenda show.com And no agenda

716
00:40:20,610 --> 00:40:23,850
nation.com. There's a Donate
button on both those sites. Now

717
00:40:23,850 --> 00:40:28,140
I've got in my interview is with
John Dixon, who is the former

718
00:40:28,140 --> 00:40:30,810
Air Force Intelligence guy runs
the denim group out of San

719
00:40:30,810 --> 00:40:36,240
Antonio, Texas, they do security
software, actually, they help

720
00:40:36,420 --> 00:40:40,560
people developing software, put
security in the software. But

721
00:40:40,560 --> 00:40:43,710
he's also got a lot of opinions
was one of the you know, a lot

722
00:40:43,710 --> 00:40:46,800
of times you interview these
guys who are CEOs and the like,

723
00:40:47,070 --> 00:40:51,690
and are in this Dixon is one of
the principles of the company.

724
00:40:51,870 --> 00:40:55,590
And they tend to be dull, or
they just self promote or just

725
00:40:55,590 --> 00:40:58,860
go really, really I believe me,
I did enough of these over the

726
00:40:58,860 --> 00:41:01,380
years. And people would always
say, Oh, he's so what does the

727
00:41:01,380 --> 00:41:04,530
guy do? I see the CTO that CTOs
are usually pretty interesting.

728
00:41:04,680 --> 00:41:09,780
Now he's the CEO. I, you know,
so it's the the guy, you know,

729
00:41:09,780 --> 00:41:11,850
especially if it's a public
company, they can't say

730
00:41:11,850 --> 00:41:14,460
anything. They can't do
anything. He did a very dope,

731
00:41:14,520 --> 00:41:18,840
this guy's interesting. I had a
good time chatting with him. And

732
00:41:19,110 --> 00:41:20,370
let's, let's play it.

733
00:41:20,610 --> 00:41:21,630
All right. But first, I

734
00:41:21,630 --> 00:41:26,940
need to program everybody's
brain vorak.org/and A.

735
00:41:30,540 --> 00:41:33,540
I'm chatting with John Dixon of
the denim group. And I want to

736
00:41:33,540 --> 00:41:36,420
get right into it. First of all,
welcome to no agenda. What do

737
00:41:36,420 --> 00:41:40,290
you think of the all these
revelations about the NSA that

738
00:41:40,290 --> 00:41:42,660
have been coming to light to
let's start right there?

739
00:41:42,810 --> 00:41:45,780
Well, I wonder how long this is
going to play out? First of all,

740
00:41:45,780 --> 00:41:49,860
that I think the phrase or
cliche that comes to mind as the

741
00:41:49,860 --> 00:41:54,720
hits just keep on coming. And,
you know, some of the

742
00:41:54,750 --> 00:42:01,710
observations that I've had are
kind of the reality that the we

743
00:42:01,710 --> 00:42:06,090
assume that at least for the
hosted email providers that they

744
00:42:06,090 --> 00:42:08,490
were probably sharing our
information with at least

745
00:42:08,490 --> 00:42:12,300
advertisers. And maybe in the
back of our heads that we

746
00:42:12,480 --> 00:42:15,630
thought that they were sharing
with law enforcement, I think

747
00:42:15,630 --> 00:42:19,650
it's the confirmation of them
and the the Swift, specific

748
00:42:19,650 --> 00:42:24,810
nature that has been probably
gotten a lot of people's

749
00:42:24,810 --> 00:42:29,070
attention. And so that's,
that's, that's the particulars

750
00:42:29,070 --> 00:42:34,260
that have probably kept this as
a front page story for some

751
00:42:34,260 --> 00:42:34,590
time.

752
00:42:35,820 --> 00:42:38,070
Yeah, one of the reasons I
wanted to talk to you is because

753
00:42:38,640 --> 00:42:43,260
since you're in a community, of
people who do this sort of work,

754
00:42:44,250 --> 00:42:49,740
security work at the computer,
there has to be gossip that goes

755
00:42:49,740 --> 00:42:53,610
around. And so I'm sure that
everyone has talked to each

756
00:42:53,610 --> 00:42:58,290
other, or either within the
company, you've probably talked

757
00:42:58,320 --> 00:43:00,270
and you probably have some
context outside of the company

758
00:43:00,270 --> 00:43:03,840
that are interesting. What kind
of gossip is going around about

759
00:43:03,870 --> 00:43:07,200
about this whole thing? What is
it? What do people think is

760
00:43:07,200 --> 00:43:13,200
behind it? Why it even happened?
Is there a, is there any

761
00:43:13,200 --> 00:43:14,850
intrigue you might imagine?

762
00:43:16,020 --> 00:43:21,630
Well, I think in one way, I'm
reacting like other Americans.

763
00:43:21,630 --> 00:43:24,360
And another way, I have a little
bit more background. And inside

764
00:43:24,390 --> 00:43:27,120
being a security professional,
I'm also used to be an

765
00:43:27,120 --> 00:43:30,510
intelligence officer and delta
in this world, but I can say

766
00:43:30,510 --> 00:43:35,010
most of my experience predates
the electronic stuff. It's more

767
00:43:35,040 --> 00:43:39,540
in the old, but these signals
intelligence. So we've got

768
00:43:39,540 --> 00:43:42,180
friends and colleagues that are
in the security industry, and

769
00:43:42,180 --> 00:43:46,200
also that work still in those in
those arenas. And I'd say

770
00:43:46,200 --> 00:43:49,680
there's a couple of
observations. And one is, if you

771
00:43:49,680 --> 00:43:52,590
remember what happened after
September 11, with the September

772
00:43:52,590 --> 00:43:55,020
11. Commission, there was, you
know, a lot of hand wringing and

773
00:43:55,020 --> 00:43:58,620
a lot of why we missed this and
stovepipes of information. So

774
00:43:58,620 --> 00:44:04,710
there was a you know, certainly
a direct and indirect, I think,

775
00:44:05,160 --> 00:44:07,800
consensus that there should, you
know, we don't want to miss

776
00:44:07,800 --> 00:44:10,590
another event. We don't want to
have that happen another

777
00:44:10,590 --> 00:44:13,710
September 11 of it, but and then
how that was interpreted by the

778
00:44:13,710 --> 00:44:16,320
different agencies is what we're
starting to see right now, what

779
00:44:16,320 --> 00:44:19,410
does that mean? Does that mean
that we want to give up all of

780
00:44:19,410 --> 00:44:22,890
our information that we want to
have our travel restricted, some

781
00:44:22,890 --> 00:44:25,110
of those things played out in
public, some of them played out

782
00:44:25,110 --> 00:44:30,450
in private? And like, what what
I'm hearing is that, you know,

783
00:44:31,410 --> 00:44:35,010
maybe six or seven weeks ago, is
on the heels of the Boston

784
00:44:35,010 --> 00:44:37,650
incident that, you know, there's
a lot of like, how do we miss

785
00:44:37,650 --> 00:44:41,280
this? How do we, you know, why
did that happen? And then now,

786
00:44:41,310 --> 00:44:44,850
the pendulum has swung the
entire way. The other ways, how

787
00:44:44,850 --> 00:44:49,920
can we possibly have permitted
this so I think that's an

788
00:44:49,920 --> 00:44:53,160
interesting one. The other thing
that is fascinating, and I think

789
00:44:53,160 --> 00:44:55,920
you pointed out a couple of
things about the tech industry,

790
00:44:56,100 --> 00:45:00,630
is how long that the telephone
companies the delay As the bell

791
00:45:00,630 --> 00:45:05,310
companies, the ATT and Verizon
have been very comfortable and

792
00:45:05,310 --> 00:45:08,310
very have a long history of
working with governments and law

793
00:45:08,310 --> 00:45:13,170
enforcement, because of wiretaps
or for the monitoring side, and

794
00:45:13,170 --> 00:45:17,250
that the different reactions of
companies that are more

795
00:45:17,250 --> 00:45:21,780
technology or Silicon Valley
based, some pushing back others

796
00:45:21,780 --> 00:45:26,910
not. I think that in the gap
between their public

797
00:45:26,910 --> 00:45:31,800
pronouncements of privacy and
privacy guarantees, and you

798
00:45:31,800 --> 00:45:34,260
know, what's happening in
practice? I think those are

799
00:45:34,260 --> 00:45:37,440
those are that puts them in an
uncomfortable position now that

800
00:45:37,440 --> 00:45:42,000
that's out in the public domain.
And the final thing is, I think

801
00:45:42,000 --> 00:45:44,160
you've alluded to it at least
one piece is this

802
00:45:44,160 --> 00:45:48,120
competitiveness, nature, okay,
think of it this way. It's one

803
00:45:48,120 --> 00:45:52,530
thing if it's the NSA that's
looking at our hosted email, or

804
00:45:52,560 --> 00:45:55,470
you know, the intelligence
agencies that are in the US, you

805
00:45:55,470 --> 00:45:57,510
know, you can make the argument
that I've got nothing to worry

806
00:45:57,510 --> 00:46:00,690
about, and I'll do anything
wrong, and who cares. But a lot

807
00:46:00,690 --> 00:46:03,300
of that hosts of emails from
people that are not non US

808
00:46:03,300 --> 00:46:07,530
citizens, obviously, if you were
a UK company that did Hosted

809
00:46:07,530 --> 00:46:14,280
Exchange for Microsoft, not just
Microsoft products, but hosted

810
00:46:14,280 --> 00:46:17,910
email. And if you look at the
small and medium sized business

811
00:46:17,940 --> 00:46:23,310
world, most of that email
starting to migrate from data

812
00:46:23,310 --> 00:46:26,430
centers and companies to the
cloud, right. So that's the part

813
00:46:26,430 --> 00:46:30,090
that I think that, you know, if
you look at our hosted Exchange,

814
00:46:30,090 --> 00:46:33,900
not just email, but like, posted
exchange, a lot of companies

815
00:46:33,900 --> 00:46:36,030
have that. And it's like, Okay,
what's my application? What are

816
00:46:36,030 --> 00:46:40,410
my expectations of privacy? If
you think about the NSA thing, I

817
00:46:40,440 --> 00:46:43,950
think if it were if we were
British citizens, and and the

818
00:46:43,950 --> 00:46:46,530
roles were reversed, or you
know, your US citizen, you find

819
00:46:46,530 --> 00:46:48,930
out the German intelligence
agencies looking at all of our

820
00:46:48,930 --> 00:46:53,790
email, you would view that
differently? I think. And maybe,

821
00:46:53,790 --> 00:46:57,960
maybe not. But I think there's,
this is just a fascinating thing

822
00:46:57,960 --> 00:47:01,230
that's playing out in a very
public way. And the other thing

823
00:47:01,230 --> 00:47:06,690
is, is that, you know, the this
could be on one end is

824
00:47:06,690 --> 00:47:10,110
illuminating as interesting as
putting, asking us to ask

825
00:47:10,110 --> 00:47:12,960
questions of ourselves, and what
are our expectations? But on the

826
00:47:12,960 --> 00:47:16,830
other end? I mean, he did give
some information to the Russians

827
00:47:16,830 --> 00:47:19,680
and Chinese that are definitely
absolutely not going to help us.

828
00:47:19,710 --> 00:47:21,240
I mean, there's no way that's a
good

829
00:47:21,240 --> 00:47:24,960
thing. What specifically do you
see that does that?

830
00:47:25,920 --> 00:47:29,760
You know, well, first of all, I,
I'm not in the team that's doing

831
00:47:29,760 --> 00:47:34,740
the damage assessment project at
Fort Meade, but my suspicion is

832
00:47:34,740 --> 00:47:38,910
what they call sources and
methods of, of the surveillance

833
00:47:38,940 --> 00:47:42,630
unit. So you have two things.
First of all, one is the

834
00:47:42,630 --> 00:47:46,500
surveillance side. But he also
is put out information about the

835
00:47:46,500 --> 00:47:49,980
attack side of the cyber
cybersecurity and the sort of

836
00:47:50,040 --> 00:47:56,070
the electronic cyber attack
side. We've been very public

837
00:47:56,070 --> 00:48:01,200
with the Chinese about their
efforts in this particular space

838
00:48:01,200 --> 00:48:04,890
and my experiences and within
the security community, is that

839
00:48:04,890 --> 00:48:09,660
as a very, very tangible threat.
It is it is when you hear the

840
00:48:09,660 --> 00:48:13,050
term nation state threat, you
can substitute Chinese, they are

841
00:48:13,080 --> 00:48:16,560
actively surveilling and
attacking not government

842
00:48:16,560 --> 00:48:19,290
entities, but also commercial
entities. It's, you know, so

843
00:48:19,290 --> 00:48:23,370
that happens all the time. What
this does, is it you know, the

844
00:48:23,400 --> 00:48:28,860
the charge that the US is doing
it to kind of makes it weakens

845
00:48:28,860 --> 00:48:34,170
our claims, or at least our
protestations that we're, you

846
00:48:34,170 --> 00:48:38,160
know, that's happening to us,
and we're not doing it. So

847
00:48:38,160 --> 00:48:40,290
that's, that's an interesting
thing, too, is that that

848
00:48:40,290 --> 00:48:44,760
revelation has come up, we do
not know is is citizens what the

849
00:48:44,760 --> 00:48:49,410
impact has been. Our will be,
but my suspicion is, is is

850
00:48:49,410 --> 00:48:52,650
handed us over to gun
governments that are less than

851
00:48:52,650 --> 00:48:57,090
friendly to us. So that's, that
can't be that can't be dismissed

852
00:48:57,090 --> 00:48:57,510
either.

853
00:48:58,230 --> 00:49:02,940
Well, I've always felt that we
have issues with the Chinese and

854
00:49:02,940 --> 00:49:07,290
so far as being I wouldn't want
to use the term hypocrites. But

855
00:49:07,920 --> 00:49:11,160
I know the Chinese are not happy
about the fact that we call them

856
00:49:11,160 --> 00:49:13,650
out for their, you know, prison
camps and all the rest of it.

857
00:49:13,650 --> 00:49:16,200
Well, we are the country that
has the most prisoners, per

858
00:49:16,200 --> 00:49:22,650
capita and in total. And the
same thing with this. And I saw

859
00:49:22,650 --> 00:49:25,920
it seemed like we're kind of
like asking for trouble. If we

860
00:49:25,950 --> 00:49:29,730
are always accusing them of
stuff that we are also doing. It

861
00:49:29,730 --> 00:49:32,970
seems to me that doesn't bode
well for the relationship, which

862
00:49:33,000 --> 00:49:37,080
really is a economic one that
needs to be it's really

863
00:49:37,080 --> 00:49:39,360
shouldn't be too adversarial
since they make almost similar

864
00:49:39,360 --> 00:49:43,380
products right now. And, yeah,
we've done a little bit about

865
00:49:43,380 --> 00:49:43,800
that.

866
00:49:44,220 --> 00:49:47,250
Yeah, we're so tied together
that it's a very interesting

867
00:49:47,250 --> 00:49:51,810
dance between us and them right
now. But I think part of their

868
00:49:52,290 --> 00:49:54,930
the attractiveness of doing the
cyber stuff is they can do

869
00:49:54,930 --> 00:49:58,470
things without it coming up to
the surface level and it being

870
00:49:58,470 --> 00:50:02,490
attributed back to them and vice
versa. So, so you know, on one

871
00:50:02,490 --> 00:50:05,790
level, we're friends, and we're
conducting commerce, and we're

872
00:50:05,790 --> 00:50:08,340
doing things that other, you
know, below the surface are

873
00:50:08,340 --> 00:50:12,390
knocking the heck out of each
other in the cyber domain. So I

874
00:50:12,390 --> 00:50:15,330
think there's some plausible
deniability there that allows

875
00:50:15,330 --> 00:50:21,840
them to do that. And again, this
this revelation is, is making

876
00:50:21,840 --> 00:50:24,750
it, you know, more of an even
playing field,

877
00:50:25,230 --> 00:50:28,380
what do we better be better off
spending our time securing these

878
00:50:28,380 --> 00:50:31,320
systems a little better than
than we've done? With

879
00:50:31,650 --> 00:50:35,880
the classic argument?
Absolutely. I mean, I got I, as

880
00:50:35,880 --> 00:50:42,000
a security guy, see, the, you
know, products and, and

881
00:50:42,000 --> 00:50:44,490
capabilities that get put up,
you know, thrust out there on

882
00:50:44,490 --> 00:50:49,140
the web, or mobile apps. And
many times, they're, you know,

883
00:50:49,140 --> 00:50:51,270
security is considered, but most
of the time not. And I'll give

884
00:50:51,270 --> 00:50:55,710
you two great examples of things
that scare me. Number one is the

885
00:50:55,710 --> 00:50:58,740
smart grid, where this is
headlong rush for all the

886
00:50:58,740 --> 00:51:03,690
electrical providers to
essentially make their legacy

887
00:51:03,870 --> 00:51:07,860
electrical distribution
connected to the TCP IP or the

888
00:51:07,920 --> 00:51:13,020
internet. And that's, that's one
thing. And number two is these

889
00:51:13,020 --> 00:51:15,990
health information exchanges and
insurance exchanges, where you

890
00:51:15,990 --> 00:51:21,210
have all of this private,
private healthcare data that's

891
00:51:21,210 --> 00:51:26,250
out there on us. And those are
two industries that have

892
00:51:26,280 --> 00:51:30,450
healthcare and the electrical
that have been less rigorous in

893
00:51:30,450 --> 00:51:33,570
their security compared to like
the financial industry. So

894
00:51:33,570 --> 00:51:37,200
you've got these, you know, oh,
we need to put data, you know,

895
00:51:37,230 --> 00:51:40,770
on the web for this, we need to
do that. I would still say that,

896
00:51:41,100 --> 00:51:45,450
always, always features and
functionality will outstrip

897
00:51:45,450 --> 00:51:48,720
security. And so yes, that
there's going to have to be some

898
00:51:49,080 --> 00:51:52,440
substantial bloody noses before
that changes.

899
00:51:52,950 --> 00:51:57,690
Well, I know my doctor had to
recently upgrade his disinfect

900
00:51:57,690 --> 00:52:02,220
his whole office of doctors,
they upgraded their system,

901
00:52:02,220 --> 00:52:05,520
because the government requires
now that they have electronic

902
00:52:06,180 --> 00:52:10,140
health records. And so they've
had to retrofit everything and

903
00:52:10,200 --> 00:52:13,680
and from what and then they have
a website that the patients can

904
00:52:13,680 --> 00:52:19,980
go to and fool around on. And
it's, it's so mediocre, because

905
00:52:19,980 --> 00:52:24,570
I've gone to the website. I
mean, it's so low end crap, to

906
00:52:24,570 --> 00:52:28,650
be honest about it, that I can't
imagine the security being any

907
00:52:28,650 --> 00:52:29,400
good at all.

908
00:52:29,790 --> 00:52:35,190
Yeah, I you might be on to
something that, you know. But

909
00:52:35,190 --> 00:52:38,250
depending on the size of the
clinic and the doctor's

910
00:52:38,250 --> 00:52:41,400
background, they you know, they
have, there's something called

911
00:52:41,400 --> 00:52:44,280
HIPAA. And there's another one,
the healthcare regulation called

912
00:52:44,280 --> 00:52:47,190
high tech that's coming out or
has come out, excuse me, and

913
00:52:47,190 --> 00:52:51,930
they're supposed to prescribe
ways of doing things. But there

914
00:52:51,930 --> 00:52:57,030
is still that is issue number
five, or six or seven. In the in

915
00:52:57,030 --> 00:53:00,480
the planning consideration.
There's still high profile cases

916
00:53:00,480 --> 00:53:02,910
where hospitals systems,
insurers are losing customer

917
00:53:02,910 --> 00:53:06,090
data. And if you see something
that looks clunky or kludgy like

918
00:53:06,090 --> 00:53:09,690
that it probably doesn't have a
sophisticated security back end,

919
00:53:09,690 --> 00:53:13,020
either. So your your, your
intuition probably serves you

920
00:53:13,020 --> 00:53:14,880
well, although I can't confirm
that.

921
00:53:14,940 --> 00:53:18,900
Yeah, well, I'm sure. It's a
model I've always used, which is

922
00:53:18,900 --> 00:53:21,960
the Gestalt model with which is
if everything looks like crap,

923
00:53:21,960 --> 00:53:24,810
and cheap and doesn't look like
a professional did it, you have

924
00:53:24,810 --> 00:53:27,840
to assume that the whole product
set way from front to front, the

925
00:53:27,840 --> 00:53:29,340
bottom, top to bottom?

926
00:53:29,700 --> 00:53:30,960
I would not doubt that.

927
00:53:31,710 --> 00:53:35,550
So what? So when you see do you
actually look at Chinese attacks

928
00:53:35,550 --> 00:53:40,080
in the Dental Group go out and
help companies when they say, I

929
00:53:40,080 --> 00:53:42,030
think these guys have been
looking at our stuff, or

930
00:53:42,060 --> 00:53:44,400
something like that company, for
example,

931
00:53:44,610 --> 00:53:47,970
we spend most of our time in the
upfront part where we help

932
00:53:47,970 --> 00:53:51,780
companies with the security,
their software, our building

933
00:53:51,780 --> 00:53:54,450
software systems that are
resilient to start with, that's

934
00:53:54,450 --> 00:53:58,050
fine. But from time to time we
get called. And when we do, it's

935
00:53:58,050 --> 00:54:01,740
usually, you know, usually this
time on a Friday afternoon and

936
00:54:01,830 --> 00:54:06,900
something is weird. It depends
on the target. So if you're a

937
00:54:06,900 --> 00:54:09,780
financial institution, that
you're probably going to give be

938
00:54:09,780 --> 00:54:13,620
attacked by the Eastern European
hacker games, you know, because

939
00:54:13,620 --> 00:54:15,720
they're looking for money.
They're looking to steal money

940
00:54:15,720 --> 00:54:20,040
and fraudsters, many of whom are
in Bella Russia or Russia or

941
00:54:20,130 --> 00:54:26,940
proper Ukraine. It's the nation
state threats. Again, the Russia

942
00:54:26,940 --> 00:54:30,690
is the China's the Iranians of
the world, who are more likely

943
00:54:30,690 --> 00:54:35,760
to go against other gets
infrastructure. Those are the

944
00:54:35,760 --> 00:54:38,400
ones that we get called in from
time to time. Here's the

945
00:54:38,400 --> 00:54:41,640
challenge. The real good ones
and the nation state guys are

946
00:54:41,640 --> 00:54:44,970
really good are exceptional
covering their tracks. Now they

947
00:54:44,970 --> 00:54:48,600
do make mistakes. But they're
they're pretty darn good, pretty

948
00:54:48,600 --> 00:54:52,680
sophisticated. So that usually
what we do is we're able to find

949
00:54:52,680 --> 00:54:57,240
out where they originate from or
kind of can deduce where they

950
00:54:57,240 --> 00:55:00,000
come from. At that point. If you
say, Well, we think it's kind

951
00:55:00,000 --> 00:55:03,570
Coming from the Ukraine, that's
kind of the end of discussion

952
00:55:03,570 --> 00:55:06,000
because you either have to turn
it over to law enforcement,

953
00:55:06,270 --> 00:55:09,810
because because most of these
companies don't have, you know,

954
00:55:09,810 --> 00:55:12,270
rule of law, excuse me,
countries have don't have the

955
00:55:12,270 --> 00:55:15,690
rule of law, or don't have the
rule of law in this area, you

956
00:55:15,690 --> 00:55:19,740
really have zero capacity to
prosecute or to litigate. So

957
00:55:19,740 --> 00:55:22,740
it's like, yeah, it started off
in this country. Yep. We think

958
00:55:22,740 --> 00:55:25,830
it came from there, if you get
that far, but the logical

959
00:55:25,830 --> 00:55:30,930
outcome is, it's a loss. And we
did a project a little bit of a

960
00:55:30,930 --> 00:55:34,110
response, maybe two years ago
for a water system and a real

961
00:55:34,110 --> 00:55:39,360
low level kind of utility. And
one of their wire transfer

962
00:55:39,360 --> 00:55:42,630
people had actually downloaded
what's called a bot or, you

963
00:55:42,630 --> 00:55:45,780
know, automated system. And it
Skander harddrive found out that

964
00:55:45,780 --> 00:55:48,780
she was the payment processor,
she did all the wire transfers

965
00:55:48,780 --> 00:55:53,220
with the utility. And they sure
enough, went out, recreated a

966
00:55:53,220 --> 00:55:58,320
computer, so overseas and then
moved 25,000, they tried to move

967
00:55:58,320 --> 00:56:02,130
50 75,000 a bunch of other
money. And they didn't catch it,

968
00:56:02,160 --> 00:56:06,060
the internal fraud filters of
the bank that was transferred

969
00:56:06,060 --> 00:56:10,530
the money said, Wait a second,
this is fishy. And in what the

970
00:56:10,560 --> 00:56:13,860
guys were doing is they had had
a compromised shell account with

971
00:56:13,860 --> 00:56:18,150
another bank in Florida. So they
didn't move the money from, you

972
00:56:18,150 --> 00:56:21,690
know, from San Antonio to
Belorussia. They moved it from

973
00:56:21,690 --> 00:56:26,130
San Antonio to to Florida. And
then it was the second one that

974
00:56:26,130 --> 00:56:28,410
they moved it offshore. So
that's one of the things that

975
00:56:28,410 --> 00:56:30,720
these guys are good at is it,
you know, the covering attracts

976
00:56:30,720 --> 00:56:34,440
and doing multiple hops. So we
can suspect that it was a nation

977
00:56:34,440 --> 00:56:39,090
state threat. Really, we're less
powered. So like one of the

978
00:56:39,090 --> 00:56:42,840
things that's interesting, I
think one of the outcomes is,

979
00:56:43,050 --> 00:56:47,070
you know, the FBI wants
companies like ours to cooperate

980
00:56:47,340 --> 00:56:50,400
and say, You know what, we think
that this attack happened from

981
00:56:50,400 --> 00:56:53,850
Russia. And like, there's
nothing we can do is as a

982
00:56:53,850 --> 00:56:57,120
consultant, and a company based
in South Texas, there's nothing

983
00:56:57,120 --> 00:57:01,290
we can do. So their their
encouragement is, hey, why don't

984
00:57:01,290 --> 00:57:03,630
you cooperate, at least let us
know what this happens. So maybe

985
00:57:03,630 --> 00:57:06,810
at the law, at the international
level, we can prevent or warn

986
00:57:06,810 --> 00:57:11,340
others, I see as an outcome for
this particular thing. Less and

987
00:57:11,340 --> 00:57:13,890
less cooperation or suspicion
between

988
00:57:13,890 --> 00:57:14,790
the NSA thing,

989
00:57:15,240 --> 00:57:19,860
and the outcome of the NSA thing
is in general. I mean, there's

990
00:57:19,890 --> 00:57:23,700
there is no law that compels
didn't group our General

991
00:57:23,700 --> 00:57:29,250
Electric or USAA, our name any
any, you know, in San Antonio

992
00:57:29,250 --> 00:57:32,520
Rackspace is here, any of the
big companies, there's nothing

993
00:57:32,520 --> 00:57:38,850
that compels me to cooperate.
However, there's an incentive

994
00:57:38,850 --> 00:57:40,920
because there's a certain point,
I really can't do anything.

995
00:57:40,920 --> 00:57:44,100
Well, let's at least let law
enforcement know that we had a

996
00:57:44,100 --> 00:57:46,440
loss here. And then for
insurance purposes, we might

997
00:57:46,440 --> 00:57:50,580
need to report it with very few
expectations to get anything

998
00:57:50,580 --> 00:57:53,850
back or even resolution, that's
gonna be harder to do now,

999
00:57:53,850 --> 00:57:58,230
because, you know, it just is
going to be harder to do, I

1000
00:57:58,230 --> 00:58:00,090
think people would be more
reluctant. And that's one of the

1001
00:58:00,090 --> 00:58:04,380
weird outcomes. I don't know, if
you follow the debate prior to

1002
00:58:04,380 --> 00:58:07,380
this, and DC, what it was all
about information sharing can,

1003
00:58:07,560 --> 00:58:12,630
you know, can the FBI and DHS
share threat information with

1004
00:58:12,660 --> 00:58:16,410
industry and then vice versa,
because, like most of the

1005
00:58:16,410 --> 00:58:19,740
critical infrastructure in the
US is in the private sector, not

1006
00:58:19,740 --> 00:58:24,270
in public sector. So we're going
to see things on our end, that

1007
00:58:24,270 --> 00:58:27,660
in aggregate might be a trend
that would be very important to

1008
00:58:27,660 --> 00:58:30,660
DHS. So we'll see something in
San Antonio, you'll see

1009
00:58:30,660 --> 00:58:33,180
something on the West Coast,
something up, you know, guys

1010
00:58:33,180 --> 00:58:36,450
like us, you're gonna see lots
of little pieces or evidence

1011
00:58:36,450 --> 00:58:41,040
that something might be going
on. It is the only way that the

1012
00:58:41,040 --> 00:58:44,670
DHS or others might see that
from a cooperation standpoint is

1013
00:58:44,670 --> 00:58:48,390
if we cooperate through sharing,
you know, there's groups that do

1014
00:58:48,390 --> 00:58:51,600
kind of industry sharing with
law enforcement, that might be a

1015
00:58:51,600 --> 00:58:53,250
casualty of this whole process.

1016
00:58:53,700 --> 00:58:55,890
That would actually make sense,
because I think I just wrote a

1017
00:58:55,890 --> 00:59:02,070
column that ran today on PC
Magazine that suggests the cut

1018
00:59:02,070 --> 00:59:05,460
if anyone should be annoyed
about this NSA problem. It

1019
00:59:05,460 --> 00:59:06,840
should be the Commerce
Department.

1020
00:59:07,170 --> 00:59:11,040
Yeah, I actually caught that
right before. And I agree. And I

1021
00:59:11,040 --> 00:59:13,410
think that's this is the second
one I would add to this. So

1022
00:59:13,560 --> 00:59:15,810
after I read your article, I
thought a couple things. First

1023
00:59:15,810 --> 00:59:17,910
of all, we don't know all the
other things that are going to

1024
00:59:17,910 --> 00:59:20,460
happen, like we're starting to
imagine what are the what are

1025
00:59:20,460 --> 00:59:23,670
the unintended outcomes of this?
And I think that's one the

1026
00:59:23,670 --> 00:59:26,940
competitiveness issue. I
mentioned. It's one thing if

1027
00:59:26,940 --> 00:59:30,810
Americans are being surveilled
by the NSA in North America, if

1028
00:59:30,810 --> 00:59:33,150
you have your Hosted Exchange in
the data center in North

1029
00:59:33,150 --> 00:59:35,640
America, and you're German
company, that's a little

1030
00:59:35,640 --> 00:59:40,200
different angle, right. And the
second thing is, is, you know,

1031
00:59:40,200 --> 00:59:43,710
industry cooperation and general
security cooperation in general

1032
00:59:43,710 --> 00:59:49,080
with law enforcement, and guys
like DHS on on legitimate issues

1033
00:59:49,170 --> 00:59:52,620
around critical infrastructure.
Again, most of the critical

1034
00:59:52,620 --> 00:59:55,260
infrastructure, particularly
energy and pipelines and

1035
00:59:55,290 --> 00:59:58,230
electrical distribution, are in
the hands of private to the

1036
00:59:58,230 --> 01:00:04,530
private sector. Um, DHS can't,
you know, compel most these

1037
01:00:04,530 --> 01:00:09,330
companies to share information
on vulnerabilities? So what has

1038
01:00:09,330 --> 01:00:15,060
happened is that is very much a
one way? Well, the argument has

1039
01:00:15,060 --> 01:00:19,050
been, it's a one way,
information sharing, we share

1040
01:00:19,050 --> 01:00:21,180
with the government, they don't
give anything back to us. You

1041
01:00:21,180 --> 01:00:25,920
know, that'll even be worse now.
So I, you know, I add that as

1042
01:00:25,920 --> 01:00:28,680
Issue number two from the
security guys perspective, and

1043
01:00:28,680 --> 01:00:34,800
that is, you know, an increased
distrust or potential distrust

1044
01:00:34,800 --> 01:00:38,640
between industry and law
enforcement, national agencies.

1045
01:00:38,640 --> 01:00:40,980
And that may happen,
particularly in the Silicon

1046
01:00:40,980 --> 01:00:45,840
Valley companies, I think, who
have a more, you know, to lose

1047
01:00:46,050 --> 01:00:51,210
their mortal is they have bigger
brands to lose. And again, no,

1048
01:00:51,210 --> 01:00:54,450
just I wrote this piece, and I
have to share it with you

1049
01:00:54,450 --> 01:00:59,490
afterwards. We're doing a, like
a fun piece for the Blackhat

1050
01:00:59,490 --> 01:01:02,910
conference coming up in Vegas at
the end this month. And I, I

1051
01:01:02,910 --> 01:01:05,850
came up with a top 10 things to
ask General Alexander if you

1052
01:01:05,850 --> 01:01:10,620
bumped into him at BlackHat. So
he's a keynote, he's going out

1053
01:01:10,620 --> 01:01:13,710
the, you know, the keynote, this
hacker cop Conference, which is

1054
01:01:13,710 --> 01:01:16,980
very interesting. And one of the
funny questions is all in jest

1055
01:01:16,980 --> 01:01:19,800
here, but one of the questions
we came up with was, you know,

1056
01:01:19,830 --> 01:01:23,310
ask him, if NSA can collect data
faster than Facebook can give it

1057
01:01:23,310 --> 01:01:28,860
away. So you have Facebook is,
you know, on one end of the

1058
01:01:28,860 --> 01:01:32,190
spectrum doesn't have a really
great reputation for privacy and

1059
01:01:32,190 --> 01:01:35,040
all that. But others have kind
of staked out a bit stronger

1060
01:01:35,040 --> 01:01:39,990
claim for that. I think that
this, this is a cast a doubt on

1061
01:01:39,990 --> 01:01:44,010
some of those claims. So the
funny thing is, though, you

1062
01:01:44,010 --> 01:01:50,310
know, again, Americans in the
US, US companies, in the US

1063
01:01:50,310 --> 01:01:53,910
intelligence agency, you know,
people have asked me, if you're

1064
01:01:53,910 --> 01:01:56,280
not doing anything wrong, what
do you have to worry about? It's

1065
01:01:56,280 --> 01:01:58,170
like, okay, you know, yeah,
that's

1066
01:01:58,170 --> 01:02:01,020
always been an argument that's
different, really annoyed me,

1067
01:02:01,020 --> 01:02:03,780
because it doesn't really
account for the real problem

1068
01:02:03,780 --> 01:02:07,890
with the loss of privacy, which
is blackmail. And in fact, I

1069
01:02:07,890 --> 01:02:10,170
would have to add one argument
is that I don't think there's a

1070
01:02:10,170 --> 01:02:13,920
person out there that has
absolutely nothing to hide,

1071
01:02:13,920 --> 01:02:16,770
because you're if you're a human
being, there's probably

1072
01:02:16,770 --> 01:02:19,110
something you've got to hide,
you want your medical records

1073
01:02:19,110 --> 01:02:21,660
out there, do you want insurance
companies jacking up your rates,

1074
01:02:21,660 --> 01:02:23,880
because they know that you have
high blood pressure? I mean,

1075
01:02:23,880 --> 01:02:26,310
there's a lot of things that you
don't really want in the public

1076
01:02:26,310 --> 01:02:31,020
domain, including, you know,
the, you know, your body

1077
01:02:31,020 --> 01:02:35,160
measurements, in fact, so, so
that argument is always, it's

1078
01:02:35,160 --> 01:02:38,070
never sat well with me, but in
fact, even if you didn't have

1079
01:02:38,070 --> 01:02:42,810
anything to hide, the does you
think it's okay to have a

1080
01:02:42,810 --> 01:02:46,290
congressman, for example, that's
been compromised through some

1081
01:02:46,290 --> 01:02:49,590
blackmailing system, and they're
voting against? What is your

1082
01:02:49,590 --> 01:02:51,690
best interest? Is that okay with
you?

1083
01:02:51,810 --> 01:02:55,320
So you just hit on one thing,
and this is the David Petraeus

1084
01:02:55,350 --> 01:02:58,470
scenario you just threw out,
which is, you know, having a

1085
01:02:58,470 --> 01:03:03,210
relationship with a reporter.
FBI investigates that reporter

1086
01:03:03,240 --> 01:03:07,050
because of perceived harassment,
in that, in the course of that

1087
01:03:07,050 --> 01:03:10,740
investigation, they find out
that she's having an affair with

1088
01:03:10,800 --> 01:03:14,100
David Petraeus, you know, well,
the problem was, it was David

1089
01:03:14,100 --> 01:03:17,580
Petraeus if she was having an
affair with Uri, which wouldn't

1090
01:03:17,580 --> 01:03:21,570
happen. You know, who cares? But
it's with the director of the

1091
01:03:21,570 --> 01:03:25,500
Central Intelligence Agency, and
it's the issue of leverage. So,

1092
01:03:25,530 --> 01:03:28,830
you know, that instance was one
where I see more of those type

1093
01:03:28,830 --> 01:03:30,930
of things happening with a trip
across this and they find

1094
01:03:30,930 --> 01:03:35,280
something else. I mean, and
here's the other thing I would

1095
01:03:35,280 --> 01:03:40,410
throw out there is that don't
anticipate bureaucracies ability

1096
01:03:40,410 --> 01:03:45,120
to make mistakes on data, you
know, think of the TSA, you

1097
01:03:45,120 --> 01:03:49,560
know, watch lists and travel
lists issues and getting Arabic

1098
01:03:49,560 --> 01:03:49,890
names,

1099
01:03:49,890 --> 01:03:53,280
right. Or the fact that Ted
Kennedy couldn't get on a plane

1100
01:03:53,280 --> 01:03:53,790
once.

1101
01:03:53,910 --> 01:03:58,500
So so that is when you, I think,
this is an important point. I

1102
01:03:58,500 --> 01:04:01,890
think our ability to collect
data has always outstripped our

1103
01:04:01,890 --> 01:04:05,310
ability to analyze it and put it
to work. Always, always, always,

1104
01:04:05,310 --> 01:04:08,490
always. If you want to draw on
another analogy, you look at the

1105
01:04:09,600 --> 01:04:13,560
US Air Force and the military's
ability to collect you know,

1106
01:04:13,560 --> 01:04:17,370
full motion video with drones
out in Afghanistan. They have

1107
01:04:17,370 --> 01:04:21,150
apparently years worth of video
that they've never been able to

1108
01:04:21,150 --> 01:04:24,600
analyze. Their ability to
collect it is outstrips their

1109
01:04:24,600 --> 01:04:28,050
ability to analyze it. I think
that'll be the case here. The

1110
01:04:28,050 --> 01:04:32,160
interest in the other one that I
like to reference is the Mumbai

1111
01:04:32,160 --> 01:04:36,600
attacks. By the the Lashkar e
Taiba Mujahideen guys in

1112
01:04:36,600 --> 01:04:42,120
Pakistan. If you've ever seen
that HBO video, the documentary

1113
01:04:42,120 --> 01:04:48,330
tearing up in Mumbai, the Indian
intelligence actually had the

1114
01:04:48,330 --> 01:04:56,670
entire operation attack recorded
they had seated prepaid cell

1115
01:04:56,670 --> 01:04:59,580
phones and a bunch of
marketplaces in Pakistan hoping

1116
01:04:59,580 --> 01:05:02,610
that the the Mujahideen would
get these things. And in fact

1117
01:05:02,610 --> 01:05:06,660
they did. What happened was they
use them these prepaid and

1118
01:05:06,660 --> 01:05:10,200
proceeded phones as the means of
communication for that attack in

1119
01:05:10,200 --> 01:05:13,830
Mumbai, guess what happened, the
Indian intelligence didn't

1120
01:05:13,860 --> 01:05:17,490
figure it out until after the
attack, they weren't able to put

1121
01:05:17,490 --> 01:05:19,800
two and two together and
correlate that information until

1122
01:05:19,800 --> 01:05:24,240
after the attack. So the other
side of this is, is your you

1123
01:05:24,240 --> 01:05:26,070
know, that's what the
intelligence guys are worried

1124
01:05:26,070 --> 01:05:28,290
about. They're worried about not
having access to the data or

1125
01:05:28,290 --> 01:05:31,290
catching them in time. It's
great to find the guys after

1126
01:05:31,290 --> 01:05:34,770
they've done something Boston,
Mumbai, September 11. It's

1127
01:05:34,770 --> 01:05:38,340
another thing, you know, if
you're able to so that's the

1128
01:05:38,340 --> 01:05:43,650
other bit of the dynamic that is
tough, that I struggle with as

1129
01:05:43,650 --> 01:05:47,910
an X intelligence guys, like,
you're asking our, you know,

1130
01:05:47,910 --> 01:05:50,940
our, our, you know, people that
are trying to do the right

1131
01:05:50,940 --> 01:05:54,660
thing, they might be efficient
or inefficient, to find needles

1132
01:05:54,660 --> 01:05:56,010
and needles,

1133
01:05:56,400 --> 01:05:59,100
and they're making bigger, and
they get the hate Oh, yeah,

1134
01:05:59,130 --> 01:06:02,190
they're making the haystack
really, really big. And in the

1135
01:06:02,190 --> 01:06:06,390
question that I asked is, you
know, what, what level what

1136
01:06:06,390 --> 01:06:10,950
percent level of protection Do
you want? Do you want a, a 90%

1137
01:06:11,010 --> 01:06:15,150
guarantee that we'll never have
a terrorist attack, or 100%.

1138
01:06:15,390 --> 01:06:19,290
Because 100% is a is a, a
completely authoritarian state.

1139
01:06:20,220 --> 01:06:20,670
Right now,

1140
01:06:21,180 --> 01:06:23,610
it's called a risk free society,
it's impossible.

1141
01:06:24,120 --> 01:06:28,380
And here's the other thing,
this, I've said this before, if

1142
01:06:28,380 --> 01:06:31,920
there is another Boston attack
like this next week, this whole

1143
01:06:31,920 --> 01:06:34,920
story goes away. And the
pendulum swings back the other

1144
01:06:34,920 --> 01:06:37,830
way. So I mean, that's the other
thing to read, I think, to

1145
01:06:37,830 --> 01:06:41,580
realize is that this is this,
this discussion will continue to

1146
01:06:41,580 --> 01:06:43,800
play out and will and
perceptions will change,

1147
01:06:43,800 --> 01:06:49,440
depending on current events. I
mean, and yeah, so I am not

1148
01:06:49,440 --> 01:06:53,550
saying I'm not using that to
justify anything. The other last

1149
01:06:53,550 --> 01:06:56,640
point I would make is a guy that
was part of this community a

1150
01:06:56,640 --> 01:07:00,180
long time ago, we're getting the
tip of the iceberg. And it's

1151
01:07:00,180 --> 01:07:04,230
very difficult to make real
strong decisions based upon the

1152
01:07:04,230 --> 01:07:06,840
information that is getting out,
and that we have the information

1153
01:07:06,840 --> 01:07:10,980
that is being leaked out. Many
times it's not within context.

1154
01:07:11,880 --> 01:07:14,010
So you're kind of getting the
tip of the spear, you don't

1155
01:07:14,010 --> 01:07:18,030
know, you know, whatever. So
that's one thing that I worried

1156
01:07:18,030 --> 01:07:21,090
about when back when I was in
the doing that kind of work, you

1157
01:07:21,090 --> 01:07:24,420
always would wonder if a certain
key event would make it in the

1158
01:07:24,420 --> 01:07:28,500
news, and it never would, and,
or we would make it in the news.

1159
01:07:28,500 --> 01:07:30,870
You know, like, that's not how
it actually happened. So I mean,

1160
01:07:31,140 --> 01:07:34,680
the chance for distortion, both
from the leaker and the

1161
01:07:34,680 --> 01:07:40,620
responders is, is off the
charts. So I mean, that's the

1162
01:07:40,620 --> 01:07:43,320
other kind of tough thing
throughout this discussion. But

1163
01:07:43,470 --> 01:07:46,800
the general fact that they are
that this is happening at the

1164
01:07:46,800 --> 01:07:52,410
level it is is the big, big
coin. And now this is a public

1165
01:07:52,410 --> 01:07:56,670
domain discussion that will
happen in a public way. And I

1166
01:07:56,670 --> 01:07:59,730
think that'll be healthy. I
don't think anybody I don't

1167
01:07:59,730 --> 01:08:02,820
know, I I'm very interested to
see how this plays out as

1168
01:08:02,820 --> 01:08:06,750
somebody both as a security
practitioner, American, and

1169
01:08:06,750 --> 01:08:11,610
also, you know, X former
intelligence officer, I can see

1170
01:08:11,610 --> 01:08:15,390
why. Some of the you know, why
general I understand Joel

1171
01:08:15,390 --> 01:08:22,350
Alexander's point. I, it's the
breadth and scale that is, that

1172
01:08:22,350 --> 01:08:25,920
is, you know, very, very
amazing.

1173
01:08:26,729 --> 01:08:30,359
Yeah, it's quite something.
Getting back to the smart grid

1174
01:08:30,389 --> 01:08:33,029
situation, which is something
I've always been skeptical of,

1175
01:08:33,029 --> 01:08:36,389
because it seems to me that your
best power grid would be a local

1176
01:08:36,389 --> 01:08:40,499
one where you were, the guy
could throw a switch by hand, or

1177
01:08:40,499 --> 01:08:43,679
should as opposed to something
interlinked, interlinked into

1178
01:08:43,679 --> 01:08:47,549
the internet, which always
seemed like a sketchy I mean, I

1179
01:08:47,549 --> 01:08:52,589
liked the idea of grids that are
not subject to cascade effect,

1180
01:08:52,739 --> 01:08:58,949
collapse. But at the same time,
I'm not liking the idea of one

1181
01:08:58,949 --> 01:09:04,139
giant grid. That smart because
these things are always not fun.

1182
01:09:04,139 --> 01:09:05,729
I mean, they're, they're not
foolproof.

1183
01:09:06,390 --> 01:09:10,350
What, what the lore for the
smart grid is and business

1184
01:09:10,350 --> 01:09:14,130
reason these guys are doing it,
I want to say, I mean utilities

1185
01:09:14,130 --> 01:09:19,200
in general electrical utilities
is they are able to dampen

1186
01:09:19,200 --> 01:09:23,040
demand during peak times in
August, specifically July and

1187
01:09:23,040 --> 01:09:25,620
August. So if you look at the
way you build a electrical

1188
01:09:25,620 --> 01:09:29,880
network, it has to be for the
capacity for peak times. And

1189
01:09:29,880 --> 01:09:33,180
that's happening now. If you can
go in and dampen demand in

1190
01:09:33,180 --> 01:09:36,780
certain houses or buildings, by
essentially remotely lowering

1191
01:09:36,780 --> 01:09:39,720
the temperature from 72. Or
excuse me, raising the

1192
01:09:39,720 --> 01:09:43,560
temperature to 72 to like 77,
you essentially save billions of

1193
01:09:43,560 --> 01:09:46,440
dollars of electrical
infrastructure by having to

1194
01:09:46,470 --> 01:09:50,100
build redundant transformers and
redundant lines. So that's the

1195
01:09:50,100 --> 01:09:52,890
allure is to basically make
every one of these remote

1196
01:09:52,890 --> 01:09:57,900
devices in the households, every
thermostat, essentially an IP

1197
01:09:57,900 --> 01:10:02,190
addressable device because you
can do it In these the 1% or 2%

1198
01:10:02,190 --> 01:10:05,940
scenario on the network, you can
turn down demand for air

1199
01:10:05,940 --> 01:10:09,540
conditioning. The challenge is,
is now everything's an IP

1200
01:10:09,540 --> 01:10:12,510
enabled device, it has a, you
know, it's a computing device.

1201
01:10:12,780 --> 01:10:16,770
And every every capability that
you create has an ability to

1202
01:10:16,770 --> 01:10:20,760
tear down or to exploit that
capability. You know, and that's

1203
01:10:20,760 --> 01:10:26,040
the thing that I worry that the
headlong rush to make sure that,

1204
01:10:26,340 --> 01:10:30,180
you know, everything is part of
the smart grid is in certain

1205
01:10:30,180 --> 01:10:34,080
instances is being done with no
little consideration for that

1206
01:10:34,080 --> 01:10:37,290
security implication, the real
problem with the electrical guys

1207
01:10:37,290 --> 01:10:42,780
to is, who would care to attack
or disruptive from a attacker

1208
01:10:42,780 --> 01:10:45,060
standpoint, it's not going to be
the Eastern European hacker

1209
01:10:45,060 --> 01:10:47,940
gangs, it's not going to be it
might be anonymous, or the

1210
01:10:47,940 --> 01:10:51,330
hacktivist gangs, it would most
likely be a nation state threat.

1211
01:10:51,750 --> 01:10:55,800
And I got to sit through an
interesting session in DC back

1212
01:10:55,800 --> 01:10:59,850
in February, January, February
timeframe, where there were a

1213
01:10:59,850 --> 01:11:02,040
bunch of industry folks, we're
talking to Representative Mike

1214
01:11:02,040 --> 01:11:07,050
McCaul who's chairman of the
House. Well, he's responsible

1215
01:11:07,050 --> 01:11:09,960
for cybersecurity things as
chairman House Homeland Security

1216
01:11:09,960 --> 01:11:14,190
Committee, and one of the
attendees was a vice president

1217
01:11:14,190 --> 01:11:18,780
at the electrical company there
around DC, she said, when we get

1218
01:11:18,780 --> 01:11:22,710
brought down by a nation state
threat, who is going to knock on

1219
01:11:22,710 --> 01:11:25,980
our door? I mean, of the 20
federal agencies and not under

1220
01:11:25,980 --> 01:11:31,890
who do we listen to first, NSA,
DHS, FBI, NERC FERC, she just

1221
01:11:31,890 --> 01:11:35,250
went down this list. And the
point is, is that if you're a

1222
01:11:35,250 --> 01:11:38,730
federal, if you're a electrical
people around DC, or other

1223
01:11:38,730 --> 01:11:41,700
critical areas, you're planning
that this might happen. And if

1224
01:11:41,700 --> 01:11:44,910
they do happen, it's going to be
the Chinese, or it's going to be

1225
01:11:44,910 --> 01:11:48,300
the Iranians or be, you know, a
nation state threat. And when

1226
01:11:48,300 --> 01:11:51,450
that happened, they are not
there's a mismatch between the

1227
01:11:51,450 --> 01:11:55,650
sophistication the attackers,
and their ability to withstand

1228
01:11:55,650 --> 01:11:57,810
that. And so that's, that's
something that has a lot of

1229
01:11:57,810 --> 01:12:01,950
people concerned. Again, the
private sector controls most of

1230
01:12:01,950 --> 01:12:07,230
that infrastructure. And it's a
fairly abstract and maybe

1231
01:12:07,650 --> 01:12:11,160
distant threat. But when it
happens, it'll be those guys.

1232
01:12:11,190 --> 01:12:12,420
And that'll be real tough.

1233
01:12:13,140 --> 01:12:20,130
Yeah. nothing to look forward
to. in your dealings with some

1234
01:12:20,130 --> 01:12:24,480
of these agency is that you bump
into quite often, I'm guessing.

1235
01:12:24,780 --> 01:12:27,660
Well, how do you because I've
noticed, I used to work for a

1236
01:12:27,660 --> 01:12:31,920
government agency, and it was a
regional agency. And the kind of

1237
01:12:31,920 --> 01:12:35,940
the rule and what kind of work
the most, in terms of our

1238
01:12:35,940 --> 01:12:41,700
thinking was the regional agency
was very, very good. And then

1239
01:12:41,700 --> 01:12:44,220
when you went to the state
version of the same agency,

1240
01:12:44,220 --> 01:12:48,840
which oversaw everything else,
they were kind of dumb. And

1241
01:12:48,840 --> 01:12:52,890
then, then when you took it one
layer higher to the feds, they

1242
01:12:52,890 --> 01:12:55,590
were extremely there were to the
point where it was they're

1243
01:12:55,620 --> 01:12:59,010
essentially stupid. And of
course, this is reflected in a

1244
01:12:59,010 --> 01:13:02,310
lot of TV dramas and the rest
where you have the, you know,

1245
01:13:02,310 --> 01:13:06,000
the idiots from the FBI, let's
say to interfering with a police

1246
01:13:06,000 --> 01:13:09,300
investigation and some cops
show. What's your experience

1247
01:13:09,300 --> 01:13:14,040
with the, with these agencies,
and without naming any more you

1248
01:13:14,040 --> 01:13:15,090
could if you want, I don't care,

1249
01:13:15,120 --> 01:13:19,410
I would say pockets of
excellence. And then pockets of

1250
01:13:19,500 --> 01:13:22,980
competency to I mean, like
you've got it's particularly in

1251
01:13:22,980 --> 01:13:27,510
our area, that cybersecurity
area, there is, you know, thin

1252
01:13:27,510 --> 01:13:30,630
talent across the board. So
you'll have some pretty sharp

1253
01:13:30,630 --> 01:13:34,860
folks, I would say probably like
the FBI, I imagine in the FBI,

1254
01:13:35,190 --> 01:13:38,280
San Francisco Bureau, they've
got a pretty crack team. If you

1255
01:13:38,280 --> 01:13:42,600
go to other places, maybe that's
inconsistent. And I have a

1256
01:13:42,600 --> 01:13:45,990
general rule of thumb. And this
is not fair. But a general rule

1257
01:13:45,990 --> 01:13:49,650
of thumb in Texas, that if I'm
doing security incidents, I'm

1258
01:13:49,650 --> 01:13:51,930
not going to call law
enforcement guys with cowboy

1259
01:13:51,930 --> 01:13:55,530
hats. And that's not fair. But
like, I don't, I'm assuming that

1260
01:13:55,530 --> 01:13:59,760
if you're a county, MT a county
sheriff that you probably are

1261
01:13:59,760 --> 01:14:02,820
not a crack forensics guy that
that is not that is probably not

1262
01:14:02,820 --> 01:14:07,320
fair to them, but it's probably
true. So, you know, like, what,

1263
01:14:07,350 --> 01:14:10,290
what the impact there is we tell
our clients, you know, step one,

1264
01:14:10,290 --> 01:14:12,750
and if you're having an incident
is not to call law enforcement,

1265
01:14:12,750 --> 01:14:16,950
because once you get once you
engage them, they treat, you

1266
01:14:16,950 --> 01:14:20,190
know, this is a big deal. And
you have to kind of think and be

1267
01:14:20,190 --> 01:14:23,070
ready to manage them and
interface with them. Because,

1268
01:14:23,280 --> 01:14:27,810
you know, they're their goals
are different from your goals.

1269
01:14:28,020 --> 01:14:31,020
And it changes things so like
you they come in and we got the

1270
01:14:31,020 --> 01:14:33,930
FBI there, they're trying to
find out who did what to whom

1271
01:14:34,110 --> 01:14:36,600
and prosecute, you're trying to
get your network back up and

1272
01:14:36,600 --> 01:14:41,880
running. Those are not the same
goal. So again, widespread

1273
01:14:41,880 --> 01:14:46,620
talent level. You know, same
thing with DOD and DHS, guys,

1274
01:14:46,620 --> 01:14:50,220
there's some super sharp ones
that we work with and then and

1275
01:14:50,220 --> 01:14:53,820
then a full spectrum after that.
I don't know that's a nice way

1276
01:14:53,820 --> 01:14:54,420
of saying it.

1277
01:14:55,320 --> 01:14:57,720
Yeah, well, that's good, I would
think would be the

1278
01:14:59,820 --> 01:15:03,300
good I didn't see like at the
local level, I've never I've not

1279
01:15:03,300 --> 01:15:05,070
experienced that with at the
local level, they were

1280
01:15:05,070 --> 01:15:07,800
fantastic. And then they were
dumber, the higher up the food

1281
01:15:07,800 --> 01:15:11,070
chain, they went, I've seen some
pretty sharp ones well meaning

1282
01:15:12,030 --> 01:15:15,300
and and then but just
inconsistent because this

1283
01:15:15,300 --> 01:15:19,350
industry has grown to the demand
for the talent has grown. Where

1284
01:15:19,350 --> 01:15:22,980
the you know, the amount of
people doing it is remained not

1285
01:15:22,980 --> 01:15:25,800
too much difference. Yeah, well,
I think

1286
01:15:25,800 --> 01:15:30,000
the difference I think, insofar
as the look of my thesis, which

1287
01:15:30,000 --> 01:15:33,570
is local smarter than the big
the bigger it gets, the dumber

1288
01:15:33,570 --> 01:15:38,970
it gets is I think valid based
on on specialty type of

1289
01:15:39,180 --> 01:15:43,830
agencies. So if you have a look,
if you had a local cyber

1290
01:15:43,860 --> 01:15:47,400
terrorist threat operation,
which may be actually

1291
01:15:47,400 --> 01:15:52,170
represented by a small company
like yours, that would be ideal.

1292
01:15:52,530 --> 01:15:55,470
I don't think you can generalize
about let's say, the health

1293
01:15:55,470 --> 01:15:58,710
department can't also can't,
which would be a small local

1294
01:15:58,710 --> 01:16:02,790
health department, which would
not do well with the police

1295
01:16:02,790 --> 01:16:03,870
either. No, I

1296
01:16:03,870 --> 01:16:06,870
think in cybersecurity stuff,
it's the opposite. I mean, the

1297
01:16:06,870 --> 01:16:09,840
higher up the food chain you go,
the more likely they are going

1298
01:16:09,840 --> 01:16:13,620
to be real technical and pretty
sharp, like San Antonio Police

1299
01:16:13,620 --> 01:16:16,170
Department and the county
sheriff probably have one or two

1300
01:16:16,170 --> 01:16:20,760
guys that are okay. What what I
would see I would confirm with

1301
01:16:20,760 --> 01:16:23,730
you is there's a chasm between
the private sector and the

1302
01:16:23,730 --> 01:16:26,940
public sector in general. I
mean, most of the, of the

1303
01:16:26,970 --> 01:16:29,730
hardcore talent is probably
working at the banks and the

1304
01:16:29,730 --> 01:16:33,450
commercial entities that that's,
you know, some something

1305
01:16:33,450 --> 01:16:37,770
reflected, somewhat reflective
of salaries and an ability to

1306
01:16:37,770 --> 01:16:42,510
keep guys like that happy. But I
think if you look, there is a

1307
01:16:42,510 --> 01:16:45,780
gap between the private and
public sector on talent, big

1308
01:16:45,780 --> 01:16:49,800
time. And like, like, if you
think about it, if you are a

1309
01:16:50,040 --> 01:16:53,190
security person who who's
getting attacked most of time,

1310
01:16:53,430 --> 01:16:56,970
many times, it's the banks, and
they have some of the

1311
01:16:56,970 --> 01:17:02,010
interesting work to do. And so
I've seen a, you know, a, for

1312
01:17:02,010 --> 01:17:06,450
example, the head of Bank of
America's group is an ex Air

1313
01:17:06,450 --> 01:17:10,590
Force guy. I'm the head of the
Sabre and Travelocity security

1314
01:17:10,590 --> 01:17:13,470
group, ex Air Force guy while
these guys migrate end up there,

1315
01:17:13,470 --> 01:17:16,860
because it's, you know,
interesting work. They're always

1316
01:17:16,860 --> 01:17:19,530
under attack. And oh, by the
way, the compensation is pretty

1317
01:17:19,560 --> 01:17:20,520
pretty darn good, too.

1318
01:17:21,330 --> 01:17:24,600
Yeah, I would suspect so. And
that's where all the money Isn't

1319
01:17:24,600 --> 01:17:25,950
this where they have to have the
talent.

1320
01:17:26,220 --> 01:17:29,910
Yeah. And they're constantly
under attack. So it's not like

1321
01:17:29,910 --> 01:17:32,580
it's a boring, you know, Hey,
quit your great government job

1322
01:17:32,580 --> 01:17:35,430
for boring, you know, jobs in
the private sector. Now, these

1323
01:17:35,430 --> 01:17:37,110
are pretty damn dynamic jobs.

1324
01:17:38,670 --> 01:17:41,310
Is there anything else? What
else? Do you guys work on it the

1325
01:17:41,310 --> 01:17:42,060
denim group?

1326
01:17:42,720 --> 01:17:47,250
Well, we, again, we are focusing
on the whole area of software

1327
01:17:47,250 --> 01:17:52,020
security. So it is the issue of
helping people build the

1328
01:17:52,020 --> 01:17:54,900
software right the first time,
and so we're always spending

1329
01:17:54,900 --> 01:17:57,660
time properly. So you're working
at the development level?

1330
01:17:57,900 --> 01:18:00,120
Exactly. At the software
development level, both in

1331
01:18:00,120 --> 01:18:04,260
mobile, and then, you know,
mostly web applications. And so

1332
01:18:04,290 --> 01:18:07,830
so like T Mobile would give you
guys a call and you help them

1333
01:18:08,010 --> 01:18:10,050
put together some app or what,

1334
01:18:10,290 --> 01:18:13,710
yeah, mostly a big companies
like that not, you know, so the

1335
01:18:13,710 --> 01:18:16,500
big companies are looking to
extend their reach out through,

1336
01:18:16,530 --> 01:18:20,310
you know, Android and iOS apps
on the mobile side, or web

1337
01:18:20,310 --> 01:18:24,300
applications on the website. And
so the key, what we try to do is

1338
01:18:24,300 --> 01:18:28,260
help them do it right, the first
time to build secure and

1339
01:18:28,260 --> 01:18:30,960
resilient apps. So they don't
get this stuff and put it out

1340
01:18:30,960 --> 01:18:34,530
and just get the teeth kicked in
when it's published. And, and

1341
01:18:34,530 --> 01:18:36,720
you see all these vulnerability
reports and all these things,

1342
01:18:36,720 --> 01:18:39,360
oh, these guys put this up. And
they got, you know, that's what

1343
01:18:39,360 --> 01:18:41,970
we're trying to do is show them
how to do it the right way, the

1344
01:18:41,970 --> 01:18:44,670
first time so that they don't go
through that process. How

1345
01:18:44,670 --> 01:18:47,310
secure are these mobile phones?
Is? Do you always hear about?

1346
01:18:47,310 --> 01:18:49,290
Oh, well, you know, they can
turn them on remotely?

1347
01:18:51,000 --> 01:18:53,850
Wow, that's a great question.
Well, it depends. None of them

1348
01:18:53,850 --> 01:19:01,440
are created. Equally. I would
say that. The interesting thing

1349
01:19:01,440 --> 01:19:06,450
is that, you know, iPhone, and
the in the Apple devices have a

1350
01:19:06,450 --> 01:19:09,210
closed system. So there's kind
of a little bit of a more of a

1351
01:19:09,210 --> 01:19:12,810
known in that, you know, the the
handset. And the operating

1352
01:19:12,810 --> 01:19:16,530
system is created by Apple made
by Apple put out there. So

1353
01:19:16,530 --> 01:19:19,590
there's a little bit more
regimen to that. And they have

1354
01:19:19,590 --> 01:19:22,110
to go through, you know, apps
have to go through some process

1355
01:19:22,110 --> 01:19:24,180
not really rigorous, but they
have to go through a process to

1356
01:19:24,180 --> 01:19:29,130
get on in the iTunes Store. The
Android side, it's a little bit

1357
01:19:29,130 --> 01:19:32,400
more wide open, there's a wider
spread, there's some secure

1358
01:19:32,400 --> 01:19:34,860
implementations in there some
that are pretty wide open, and

1359
01:19:34,860 --> 01:19:38,400
you got every device under the
sun. The bigger challenge that

1360
01:19:38,400 --> 01:19:41,370
we see now is again, how do you
understand what the software is

1361
01:19:41,370 --> 01:19:44,340
doing on your device? Is it
actually sending data or

1362
01:19:44,340 --> 01:19:47,820
location data that you're that
you don't know? What does it do

1363
01:19:47,820 --> 01:19:47,940
in

1364
01:19:48,660 --> 01:19:53,820
effect, when you load almost any
of the apps on these phones that

1365
01:19:53,820 --> 01:19:56,490
they essentially ask you to turn
on everything?

1366
01:19:57,089 --> 01:20:00,329
That's by default, and that's
bad and so it's So what's

1367
01:20:00,329 --> 01:20:02,699
happened right now is like, I'm
not going to know, you're not

1368
01:20:02,699 --> 01:20:04,469
going to be able to know, hey,
is this software? Does the

1369
01:20:04,469 --> 01:20:07,289
software do it on my phone? Is
it secure? Is it creating a

1370
01:20:07,289 --> 01:20:09,569
risk? For me? Is it sending data
that shouldn't be you don't know

1371
01:20:09,569 --> 01:20:12,029
that. So what's happened up to
this point is people are

1372
01:20:12,029 --> 01:20:15,509
trusting the brands. They say,
Look, that's an app from Wells

1373
01:20:15,509 --> 01:20:19,589
Fargo, for Bank of America or
from USAA, you know, that the I

1374
01:20:19,589 --> 01:20:22,319
know those guys, they are
trusted brand. I like those

1375
01:20:22,319 --> 01:20:25,739
guys, I'm assuming that they've
done the right thing. And I've

1376
01:20:25,739 --> 01:20:28,769
checked the security this. So
that's the proxy up to this

1377
01:20:28,769 --> 01:20:31,589
point has been the brand more
than the actual software. So

1378
01:20:31,739 --> 01:20:35,159
there's no like rating scale,
like restaurant, you know,

1379
01:20:35,159 --> 01:20:38,789
rating scale, there's nobody
auditing these apps. And you

1380
01:20:38,789 --> 01:20:43,199
know, the kind of the joke about
the iPhone world is that, you

1381
01:20:43,199 --> 01:20:46,469
know, Apple checks for hand a
set of things to make sure that,

1382
01:20:46,499 --> 01:20:49,769
you know, number one, that you
don't actually blow up the phone

1383
01:20:49,769 --> 01:20:53,039
network that you don't put on
objectionable material, and most

1384
01:20:53,039 --> 01:20:56,009
importantly, you don't compete
with Apple, you know, so that's

1385
01:20:56,009 --> 01:20:58,319
what they're checking for.
They're not checking whether or

1386
01:20:58,319 --> 01:21:01,379
not there's backdoors. There,
your SIP Tisha Slee, you know,

1387
01:21:01,379 --> 01:21:04,109
sending data to somewhere
offshore or not do it's not

1388
01:21:04,109 --> 01:21:06,059
doing any of that stuff. It just
simply is not.

1389
01:21:07,470 --> 01:21:10,020
Alright, well, I think that
should wrap it up. I think

1390
01:21:10,020 --> 01:21:12,120
unless you think there's a
question I should have asked.

1391
01:21:12,360 --> 01:21:16,560
No, John, I enjoyed it. And I,
my thoughts on this whole NSA,

1392
01:21:16,740 --> 01:21:20,850
Eric Snowden thing continue to
evolve. And I just think there's

1393
01:21:20,880 --> 01:21:25,050
more, a lot more that's gonna
come out not only in the data

1394
01:21:25,050 --> 01:21:28,320
that he releases, but probably
more importantly, the unintended

1395
01:21:28,320 --> 01:21:30,900
consequences. And I think your
piece on the economic

1396
01:21:31,050 --> 01:21:35,010
competitiveness one is just one
facet of that. So I mean, I'm

1397
01:21:35,040 --> 01:21:38,310
continue to write about that and
think about it. And like I said,

1398
01:21:38,310 --> 01:21:41,670
I'll make sure to give you my
two cents from Blackhat. When

1399
01:21:41,670 --> 01:21:42,630
we're out there in three weeks.

1400
01:21:42,660 --> 01:21:45,840
Yeah, I'd be very interested in
what happened. Okay, John. Okay.

1401
01:21:45,840 --> 01:21:48,450
Thanks. Have a great weekend.
Yeah, same to you, John. Bye.

1402
01:21:49,860 --> 01:21:56,040
Bye. That was John Dixon of the
denim group, also a security guy

1403
01:21:56,040 --> 01:21:58,620
that felt like chatting about
the NSA with me, and I

1404
01:21:58,620 --> 01:22:01,020
appreciate that. And hope you
guys enjoyed that.

1405
01:22:01,769 --> 01:22:05,189
I enjoyed it. Yeah, I bet you
did in Florence.

1406
01:22:06,630 --> 01:22:08,010
I would enjoy anything and

1407
01:22:09,000 --> 01:22:11,190
you should have come in to visit
me. I can't believe that you're

1408
01:22:11,190 --> 01:22:13,170
in Detroit right now. Well,

1409
01:22:14,130 --> 01:22:18,540
since I'm on tape, digital tape,
I'm really not in Detroit, but

1410
01:22:19,050 --> 01:22:21,180
hopefully I will be. We're gonna

1411
01:22:21,180 --> 01:22:26,880
be back on Thursday, August 1, I
will be in back in Amsterdam.

1412
01:22:27,120 --> 01:22:30,150
Back in the ghetto somewhere.
Three stories up. But we're

1413
01:22:30,150 --> 01:22:32,130
going to have a whole bunch of
stuff to talk about

1414
01:22:32,250 --> 01:22:35,370
live show. We have like a week's
worth of material you're gonna

1415
01:22:35,370 --> 01:22:36,660
gather throughout Europe.

1416
01:22:36,690 --> 01:22:39,720
Yeah, I'm gonna have a lunch.
Yeah, no, I'll have

1417
01:22:39,720 --> 01:22:41,940
a lot of you that you've gotten
to the end, you would have gone

1418
01:22:41,940 --> 01:22:45,060
to the party by then the party
with the elites? Oh, yeah. No,

1419
01:22:45,060 --> 01:22:45,510
no, no,

1420
01:22:45,810 --> 01:22:48,510
no, the party with the
ambassador of Barbados and all

1421
01:22:48,510 --> 01:22:50,010
that. No, no, it's gonna be
cool. It's gonna

1422
01:22:50,940 --> 01:22:53,280
have narcolepsy and all that
kind of thing.

1423
01:22:54,270 --> 01:22:57,360
Exciting. Make sure you you
support us by going to

1424
01:22:57,360 --> 01:23:01,680
divorce.org/n. A, you can get in
for an executive producer ship

1425
01:23:01,680 --> 01:23:05,820
or Associate Executive Producer
ship or even an episode club

1426
01:23:05,820 --> 01:23:09,510
membership. We look forward to
talking to you then. And until

1427
01:23:09,510 --> 01:23:13,170
then, coming to you from
somewhere in Europe on my way to

1428
01:23:13,170 --> 01:23:14,640
the lowlands. I'm Adam curry,

1429
01:23:14,760 --> 01:23:18,420
and from Northern Silicon
Valley. I'm John C. Dvorak.

1430
01:23:18,600 --> 01:23:21,990
I'm glad you remembered. We'll
talk to you again on Thursday,

1431
01:23:22,080 --> 01:23:24,720
August 1 Right here on no agenda

1432
01:23:25,560 --> 01:23:29,370
devora.org/n A